DENUCLEARIZATION DESIGN
Document
& Study Guide
BRITAIN & THE IRAQ WAR 2003
The Issue: How did Britain join the 2003 Iraq War, if there were no nuclear weapons or other WMDı in Iraq?
This question puzzles
Britons, and all others concerned by the launching of the Iraq War. Sometime
long before 19 March 2003 Tony Blair probably made a commitment to GW Bush that
Britain would join at attack on Iraq. But at home, given opposition in his own
Labour Party, Blair had seemed to accept that a second UN Security Council
resolutionı containing an agreed authorization of the use of force against Iraq
would be necessary, a prerequisite to Britainıs joining the war.
In the end, however, there
was no second resolutionı, because many on the UNSC thought Washington hasty,
for example in not giving UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections a chance, or
wrong-footed.
The row about British
authorization to make war came down to these six questions:
[1] Did Prime Minister Tony
Blair, before Congress and Parliament had voted to authorize war, strike a deal
with GW Bush to join in an invasion of Iraq? If so, why?
[2] Did Blair make
inadequately evidenced claims about Iraqi WMD, in proffers to the House of Commons
and the public? If so, who should have blown the whistle, but did not?
[3] Just what was the
Attorney Generalıs advice to Blair, especially in March 2003, about the legality of going to war in Iraq?
[4] Did Blair or his
Government distort the evidence of Iraqi WMDı, or advice given to him, or
lean onı the Attorney General to adopt a strained interpretation of the
evidence as it bore on legalityı?
[5] Did Blair fail to give
adequate scrutiny to texts prepared for him by British intelligence, or fail to
make adequate demand for the evidence that the most striking claims were true,
before adopting those texts as his own?
[6] Did Blair lie to the
House of Commons?
The British move to war is
tracable in a number of key documents and episodes. A systematic critique is
developed, for example, in the 2004.08 complaint A Case to Answer, cited below. The British Government position is amply
made out in its statements and ex post facto reviews.
Episodes prompting texts and explanations include
[a] the Blair governmentıs
need to make a case before the House of Commons and the public;
[b] interviews given and
testimony, and then suicide, of David Kelly, perhaps Britainıs most knowledgable
expert on BW arms control;
[c] the resignation, two days
before the war was launched, of Elizabeth Wilmshurst, a key British government
expert on international law.
In addition, we list key US
documents, decisions and publications which are germane to the UK position.
The Documents
1992.03.11 The
Washington Post reports the
existence of a draft Defense Planning Guidance, which includes several possible
war scenarios, including war against Iraq.[1]
The
Washington Post summarises that
the report ³contemplates use of American military power to preempt or punish² use
of nuclear, chemical, or biological weaponsthen directly quoting the
text³even in conflicts that otherwise do not directly engage U.S. interests.²
The Pentagon sought to dismiss the text as a draft.
1998.01.26 A
private letter to President Clinton urging Saddam Husseinıs ³removal from
power.²
This
letter advances a case for Clinton to ³act decisively² to bring about ³the
removal of Saddam Husseinıs regime from power.² Not to do so is to ³accept a
course of weakness and drift.² The letterıs significance lies in the signers,
among them a number who hold positions in or near the GW Bush administration:
Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld,
Paul Wolfowitz, and R. James Woolsey. The writers utter a number of the arguments
which were to echo in 2002 and 2003. Containmentı of Saddam is eroding. Even
if weapons inspections were resumed ³experience has shown that it is difficult
if not impossible to monitor Iraqıs chemical and biological weapons
production.² ³Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy is dangerously
inadequate.²
The
only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will
be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near
term, this means a willingness to undertake military action [2]
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
2000.08 Project
for a New American Century. ³Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century.²
[3]
This
document lays out a plan for future US policy, in which Iraq is mentioned 25
times in 90 pages. It argues, for example, that
the United States has for decades sought to play a more
permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with
Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American
force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam
Hussein. We cannot allow North Korea, Iran, Iraq or similar states to
undermine American leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the
American homeland itself. The blessings of the American peace, purchased at
fearful cost and a century of effort, should not be so trivially squandered.
http://www.newamericancentury.org/defensenationalsecurity2000.htm
White
House caption: President George W.
Bush appears with British Prime Minister Tony Blair at a press conference at
Crawford High School in Crawford, Texas on April 6, 2002. White House Photo by
Paul Morse.[4]
2002.04.06 PM
Blair and GW Bush meet in Crawford, Texas, and hold a joint news conference.
They respond to a question on Iraq:
Q.
Thank you. Mr. President, you have yet to build an international coalition for
military action against Iraq. Has the violence in the Middle East thwarted your
efforts? And Prime Minister Blair, has Bush convinced you on the need for a
military action against Iraq?
THE
PRESIDENT: Adam, the Prime Minister and I, of course, talked about Iraq. We
both recognize the danger of a man whoıs willing to kill his own people
harboring and developing weapons of mass destruction. This guy, Saddam Hussein,
is a leader who gasses his own people, goes after people in his own
neighborhood with weapons of -- chemical weapons. Heıs a man who obviously has
something to hide.
He
told the world that he would show us that he would not develop weapons of mass
destruction and yet, over the past decade, he has refused to do so. And the
Prime Minister and I both agree that he needs to prove that he isnıt developing
weapons of mass destruction.
I
explained to the Prime Minister that the policy of my government is the removal
of Saddam and that all options are on the table.
THE
PRIME MINISTER: I can say that any sensible person looking at the position of
Saddam Hussein and asking the question, would the region, the world, and not
least the ordinary Iraqi people be better off without the regime of Saddam
Hussein, the only answer anyone could give to that question would be, yes.
Now,
how we approach this, this is a matter for discussion. This is a matter for
considering all the options. But a situation where he continues to be in breach
of all the United Nations resolutions, refusing to allow us to assess, as the
international community have demanded, whether and how he is developing these
weapons of mass destruction. Doing nothing in those circumstances is not an
option, so we consider all the options available.
But
the President is right to draw attention to the threat of weapons of mass
destruction. That threat is real. How we deal with it, thatıs a matter we
discuss. But that the threat exists and we have to deal with it, that seems to
me a matter of plain common sense.
Q. Prime Minister, weıve heard the
President say what his policy is directly about Saddam Hussein, which is to
remove him. That is the policy of the American administration. Can I ask you
whether that is now the policy of the British government? And can I ask you
both if it is now your policy to target Saddam Hussein, what has happened to
the doctrine of not targeting heads of states and leaving countries to decide
who their leaders should be, which is one of the principles which applied
during the Gulf War?
THE
PRIME MINISTER: Well, John, you know it has always been our policy that Iraq
would be a better place without Saddam Hussein. I don't think anyone can be in
any doubt about that, for all the reasons I gave earlier. And you know reasons
to do with weapons of mass destruction also deal with the appalling brutality
and repression of his own people. But how we now proceed in this situation, how
we make sure that this threat that is posed by weapons of mass destruction is
dealt with, that is a matter that is open. And when the time comes for taking
those decisions, we will tell people about those decisions.
But
you cannot have a situation in which he carries on being in breach of the U.N.
resolutions, and refusing to allow us the capability of assessing how that
weapons of mass destruction capability is being advanced, even though the
international community has made it absolutely clear that he should do so.
Now,
as I say, how we then proceed from there, that is a matter that is open for us.
THE
PRESIDENT: Maybe I should be a little less direct and be a little more nuanced,
and say we support regime change.
Q
Thatıs a change though, isnıt it, a change in policy?
THE
PRESIDENT: No, itıs really not. Regime change was the policy of my predecessor,
as well.
Q
And your father?
THE
PRESIDENT: You know, I can't remember that far back. (Laughter.) Itıs certainly
the policy of my administration. I think regime change sounds a lot more civil,
doesnıt it? The world would be better off without him. Let me put it that way,
though. And so will the future.
See,
the worst thing that can happen is to allow this man to abrogate his promise,
and hook up with a terrorist network. And then all of a sudden youıve got one
of these shadowy terrorist networks that have got an arsenal at their disposal,
which could create a situation in which nations down the road get blackmailed.
We canıt let it happen, we just canıt let it happen. And, obviously, the Prime
Minister is somebody who understands this clearly. And thatıs why I appreciate
dealing with him on the issue. And weıve got close consultations going on, and
we talk about it all the time. And heıs got very good advice on the subject,
and I appreciate that.[5]
³President
Bush, Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Conference,² Remarks by President Bush
and Prime Minister Tony Blair in Joint Press Availability, Crawford High
School, Crawford, Texas, 6 April
2002.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020406-3.html
2002.07.23 Reported
Prime Ministerıs meeting, of which a document said to be minutes of the meeting
was published in the Sunday Times
[London] on 1 May 2005. According to the Guardian
The meeting was attended by Geoff Hoon, the defence
secretary, Mr Straw, Lord Goldsmith, Sir Richard Wilson, the cabinet secretary,
John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (now head of MI6),
Francis Richards, then director of GCHQ, Lord Boyce, then chief of defence
staff, Sir Richard Dearlove, Mr Scarlett's predecessor, and three of Mr Blair's
close aides: Jonathan Powell, Baroness Sally Morgan, and Alastair Campbell. [6]
A
reading of the document by Independent [London] correspondent Nigel Morris sees this significance:
Leaked Downing Street papers disclosed yesterday that
the Prime Minister was privately contemplating ³regime change² in Iraq in July
2002, while publicly insisting Saddam could avoid war if he complied with
United Nations resolutions.
The
documents will bolster accusations by the warıs opponents that Mr Blair agreed
to support military intervention at a meeting with George Bush at the
Presidentıs Texas ranch back in April 2002, a charge denied by the Government.
In
a further blow , the Chief of Defence Staff at the time of the war, Admiral Sir
Michael (now Lord) Boyce, expressed his concerns the war might have been
illegal.[7]
The
Sunday Times [London], 1 May 2005.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
Richard
Norton-Taylor and Patrick Wintour, The Guardian [London], 2 May
2005.
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/election/story/0,15803,1474755,00.html
Nigel
Morris, The Independent [London], 2 May 2005.
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=634942
2002.08. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. ³Iraq: A New Approach.²
http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Iraq.Report.pdf
2002.09.07 Tony
Blair and GW Bush Meet at Camp David, Maryland.[8]
2002.09.09 International
Institute for Strategic Studies [London]. ³Iraqıs Weapons of Mass Destruction:
A Net Assessment.²
Unavailable on the Web, but sold in hard copy: see
http://www.iiss.org/confPurchase.php?confID=3
2002.09.24 United
Kingdom. ³Iraqıs Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government.²
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6139.asp
Released
on the morning of the Tuesday, 24 September 2002 House of Commons debate, this
report embodies claims and judgments of Britainıs intelligence services, but
does not offer sources other than those in the public realm. It includes the
45-minutesı claim. The text:
[Blairıs
forward, p. 4] ³And the document discloses that his military planning allows
for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.²
[Executive
Summary, p. 5] ³6. As a result of
the intelligence we judge that Iraq has: ● military plans for the use
of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population.
Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use
them;²
[Text,
p. 17] ³● Iraqıs military
forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control
and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy
these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so;²
[Text,
p. 19] [Subhead] ³Recent Intelligence² [Text] ³● Saddamıs willingness to
use chemical and biological weapons: intelligence indicates that as part of
Iraqıs military planning Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological
weapons, including against his own Shia population. Intelligence indicates that
the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45
minutes of an order to do so.²
2002.09.24 Prime
Minister Tony Blairıs speech to the House of Commons.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020924/debtext/20924-01.htm#20924-01_head0
2002.09.24 United
Kingdom. House of Commons. Iraq Resolution.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm030318/debtext/30318-06.htm#30318-06_head1
2002.10.04 United
States. Central Intelligence Agency. ³Iraqıs Weapons of Mass Destruction Program.²
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm
This
well-illustrated overview covers much the same ground as the 24 September 2002
British dossier.
2002.10.11 United
States. Congress. ³Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.² Public Law
107-243October 16, 2002.
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ243.107
Issues
concerning Congressı grant of authority to undertake war in Iraq are canvassed
in Bruce D. Larkin, ³The Iraq War of 2003 and the Politics of
Denuclearization,² for which the URL is at the end of this guide.
2002.11.08 United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. S/RES/1441 (2002).
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1441%20(2002)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC
2003.01.27 United Nations.
Transcript of Statement by Hans Blix to the United Nations Security Council, 27
January 2003. Transcript of Statement by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to the UN Security Council,
27 January 2003. The New York
Times, 28 January 2003.
2003.02.05 US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented to the UN Security Council Washingtonıs
case that Iraq was in breach of UN resolutions. [Some of the assertions he made
were later shown to be wrong.]
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.htm
2003.01.31 In
a secret memorandum of this date, Frank Koza, a US National Security Agency official,
called for intensified surveillance of UN Security Council member statesı delegationsı
communications. A copy to NSAıs British counterpart, GCHQ, was leaked by a GCHQ
employee, and Ms. Katherine Gun was charged.[9]
Correspondents Martin Bright and Peter Beaumont wrote, in part:
Translators and analysts at the Government's top-secret
surveillance centre GCHQ were ordered to co-operate with an American espionage
'surge' on Security Council delegations after a request from the US National
Security Agency at the end of January 2003. This was designed to help smooth
the way for a second UN resolution authorising war in Iraq.
The
information was intended for US Secretary of State Colin Powell before his
presentation on weapons of mass destruction to the Security Council on 5
February.
Sources
close to the intelligence services have now confirmed that the request from the
security agency was 'acted on' by the British authorities. It is also known
that the operation caused significant disquiet in the intelligence community on
both sides of the Atlantic.
See
also Patrick Radden Keefe, Chatter: Dispatches from the Secret World of
Global Eavesdropping (New York:
Random House, 2005), pp. 29-47, which inter alia reports his interviews with Katherine Gun.
The
full text of Frank Kozaıs memorandum is at
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12239,905954,00.html
2003.02.03 Britain
issues the paper ³IraqIts Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation².
This is subsequently found to have included material plagiarized from an
article by California-based Ibrahim al-Marashi, and becomes known as the dodgie
dossierı.[10]
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page1470.asp
2003.03.07 UK Attorney General Lord Goldsmith submits an
advice to PM Tony Blair on the legality of initiating war against Iraq. This
document, and Lord Goldsmithıs second advice of 17 March 2003, are the subject
of great controversy. Did Lord Goldsmith change his mind between the first and second
advice? Or did he abandon his first advice under pressure? Were the Attorney Generalıs views
accurately conveyed by PM Blair to the Commons? The full text of the 7 March
document was released on 28 April 2005:
United
Kingdom. Office of the Prime Minister. Lord Goldsmiths advice of 7 March 2003,
titled ³Resolution 144².[pdf] [Scanned copy of original 'SECRET' document.]
http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/Iraq%20Resolution%201441.pdf
Guardian [London], 2005.04.28. The text of the 7 March 2003
document, in two parts:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1472450,00.html
and
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1472459,00.html
United
Kingdom. Hansard. House of Commons Debate on Iraq, 2003.03.18.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030318/debtext/30318-06.htm#30318-06_spmin2
Colin
Brown, Independent [London],
³Blair accused of gross deceptionı as Goldsmithıs advice is published.²
2005.04.28.
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=633717
A
chronology of the Countdown to War, 8 November 2002 to 20 March 2003; and hot
links to documents: Guardian,
2005.04.28.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1472085,00.html
Simon
Jeffery and Tom Happold, ³Full Iraq Legal Advice Released²: Guardian [London], 2005.04.28.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1472115,00.html
2003.03.17 UK
Attorney General Lord Goldsmith submits a one-page nine-paragraph statement, on
which the Blair Government relies, which reportedly argues that UNSC 1441 is
sufficient to meet any objections that initiating war would be illegal.
Guardian
[London], 2003.03.17. Lord
Goldsmithıs advice of 17 March 2003:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1471659,00.html
2003.03.17 Notified
by the United States that war is impending, the United Nations and IAEA
withdraw the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors
from Iraq after a stay of about four months.
2003.03.18 Elizabeth
Wilmshurst, deputy legal adviser at
the British Foreign Office, submits her letter of resignation.[11]
Her
letter stated: ³My views accord
with the advice that has been given consistently in this office before and
after the adoption of SCR (UN security council resolution) 1441, and with what
the attorney general gave us to understand was his view prior to his letter of
7 March.²
Former
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, who opposed the war, said ³It is very difficult
to avoid the conclusion that what changed was the discovery that we were not
going to get the second resolution.²[12]
2003.03.19 Iraq
War begun.
2003.05.23 Dr.
David Kelly had a conversation with Andrew Gilligan, defence and diplomatic
correspondent of the Today program on BBC4.. [Hutton Report, ĥ 30.
2003.05.29 At
6.07 am on the BBC Today program the following was broadcast. JHı is John Humphreys,
AGı is Andrew Gilligan. A central issue is whether David Kelly told Andrew
Gilligan that the Blair government knew its claim about Iraq 45-minute WMD readiness was not true.
JH: The
government is facing more questions this morning over its claim about weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq. Our defence correspondent is Andrew Gilligan. This in particular Andy is Tony Blair
saying, theyıd be ready to go within forty five minutes.
AG: Thatıs
right, that was the central claim in his dossier which he published in September,
the main erm, case if you like against er, against Iraq and the main statement
of the British governmentıs belief of what it thought Iraq was up to and what
weıve been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that
dossier was that, actually the government probably erm, knew that that forty
five minute figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in. What this
person says, is that a week before the publication date of the dossier, it was
actually rather erm, a bland production. It didnıt, the, the draft prepared for
Mr Blair by the Intelligence Agencies actually didnıt say very much more than
was public knowledge already and erm, Downing Street, our source says ordered a
week before publication, ordered it to be sexed up, to be made more exciting
and ordered more facts to be er, to be discovered.
JH: When
you say more facts to be discoveredı, does that suggest that they may not have
been facts?
AG: Well,
erm, our source says that the dossier, as it was finally published, made the Intelligence
Services unhappy, erm, because, to quote erm the source he said, there was
basically, that there was, there was, there was unhappiness because it didnıt reflect,
the considered view they were putting forward, thatıs a quote from our source
and essentially, erm, the forty-five minute point er, was, was probably the
most important thing that was added. Erm, and the reason it hadnıt been in the
original draft was that it was, it was only erm, it only came from one source
and most of the other claims were from two, and the intelligence agencies say
the donıt really believe it was necessarily true because they thought the
person making the claim had actually made a mistake, it got, had got mixed up.
JH: Does
any of this matter now, all this, all these months later? The warıs been fought
and won.
AG: Well
the forty five minutes isnıt just a detail, it did go to the heart of the governmentıs
case that Saddam was an imminent threat and it was repeated four times in the
dossier, including by the Prime Minister himself, in the foreword; so I think
it probably does matter. Clearly, you know, if emr, if it, if it was, if it was
wrong things do, things are, got wrong in good faith but if they knew it was
wrong before they actually made the claim, thatıs perhaps a bit more serious.
JH: Andrew,
many thanks; more about this later.
2003.07.15-16 Dr.
David Kelly gave evidence, separately, to the Foreign Affairs Committee and the
Intelligence and Security Committee of the House of Commons.[13]
2003.07.18 The
body of Dr. David Kelly found,[14]
an apparentı suicide.
2003.09.09 United
Kingdom. House of Commons. Intelligence and Security Committee. Iraqi
Weapons of Mass DestructionIntelligence and Assessments.
The covering letter to Prime Minister Blair states:
³This Report does not judge whether the decision to invade Iraq was correct.
Its purpose is to examine whether the available intelligence, which informed
the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it
was accurately reflected in Government publications.²
2003.10.02 US.
Central Intelligence Agency. Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report
on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. [Kay
Report]
2004.01.28 United
Kingdom. Lord Hutton. Report of an Inquiry Into the Circumstances
Surrounding the Death of Dr. David Kelly. C.M.G. [The Hutton Report]
Lord
Hutton was appointed by the Prime Minister to conduct this inquiry. Critics dismissed
the Hutton Report as a whitewash. The Hutton inquiry site, however, contains
extensive testimony and documents.
The
site: http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk
The report: http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/report/
2004.07.14 United
Kingdom. Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors. Rt Hon The Lord Butler of
Brockwell KG GCB CVO, Chairman. ³Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction.²
[The Butler Report]
The
associated site also contains useful documents.
The
site: http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/
The
review:
http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf
Beware
the hoax site at http://www.butlerreview.org
2004.08.23 Glen
Rangwala and Dan Plesch. A Case to Answer: A first report on the potential impeachment
of the Prime Minister for High Crimes and Misdemeanours in relation to the invasion
of Iraq. Produced for Adam Price MP.
http://www.impeachBlair.org
2004.09.30 US Central Intelligence
Agency. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqıs WMD.
Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence.
This
report, the final report of the Iraq Survey Group, follows David Kayıs interim
report of 2 October 2003. The Iraq Survey Group found no evidence of
significant chemical or biological agents, no evidence of nuclear weapons, and
no evidence of ongoing programs to make or acquire BW, CW, or nuclear weapons.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html
2005.04.28 The
Office of the Prime Minister releases Lord Goldsmithıs 7 March 2003 advice to
PM Blair on legality of the impending Iraq War. [See entries for 2003.03.07 and 2003.03.17 for links to
the two advices of Attorney General Lord Goldsmith.]
2005.05.01 The
Sunday Times [London] publishes
what is said to be a minute of a conference held 23 July 2002, among PM Blair
and his closest advisers, on the posture to take vis-á-vis Iraq and US
intentions.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
Also See
2002.12.08 Bruce
D. Larkin, ³Iraq: Go to War? and the Nuclear Question.²
http://www.gcdd.net/TX.024=2002.12.08.Iraq.pdf
2003.11.17 Bruce
D. Larkin, ³The Iraq War of 2003 and the Politics of Denuclearization.²
http://www.gcdd.net/TX=2003/TX.028=2003.11.11.IraqWar.pdf
Version: 2
May 2005. Global
Collaborative on Denuclearization Design www.gcdd.net