Designing Denuclearization:

Errata and Extensions

Explanation

This note contains extensions and errata associated with the book Designing Denuclearization: An Interpretive Encyclopedia.¹

Errata are cued to chapters and pages. The section Formatting Errata notes some inconsistencies in formatting, introduced by the publisher at the time of production. Extensions are not changes to the book, but call attention to subsequent developments and observations that may be useful to the reader.

Formatting Errata and Minor Corrections

In a few places typesetting strayed from the ms., so that quoted material does not have the font size or placement elsewhere given to quotations. It is otherwise clear from context, in each case, that an identified source is being directly quoted.

Page 25 Katzenbach’s words end at “making a bomb.” The following words are my own. The line should read:

Katzenbach could write that “We have no evidence that Israel is actually making a bomb … ” despite many indicators noted by intelligence analysts.

Pages 31-32 Some quoted material is reproduced in a font larger than that designated for quoted material. The quotation from Müller is correctly sized, but some subsequent quotations are not. The section should read [except that footnote numbers are placeholders]:

• 1992: IAEA Safeguards Agreement

North Korea signed the safeguards agreement with IAEA, required by its adherence to the NPT, on 30 January 1992. The agreement entered into force 10 April 1992. Müller et al. comment that

While the failure to conclude a safeguards agreement within the prescribed 180 days after accession is not unique among NPT [non-nuclear weapon states], North Korea was the only case where an NPT party without full-scope safeguards was conducting significant nuclear activities.

• 1993: first withdrawal from the NPT

On 12 March 1993 North Korea withdrew from the NPT, after a controversy with the IAEA about inspections, withdrawal to be effective on 12 June 1993. In June North Korea “suspended” the withdrawal (see U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement, below). A DPRK specialist describes the resulting circumstances:

Since June 1993 … the DPRK has had a unique status based on its unilateral suspension of its announced withdrawal from the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Therefore, the DPRK is not obliged to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards, but only is in a position to agree to accept inspections exclusively designed for the continuity of safeguards, a modality that conforms with its current unique NPT status. This was accepted both by the USA and the IAEA Secretariat, and they have also officially agreed on this with the DPRK.
• 1993: U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement and suspension of withdrawal from NPT

Joint Statement of the United States and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, issued 11 June 1993. The joint statement said in part:

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to principles of:

- Assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons;

- Peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, including impartial application of fullscope safeguards, mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; and

- Support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

In this context, the two Governments have agreed to continue dialogue on an equal and unprejudiced basis. In this respect, the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has decided unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Page 32 The final paragraph is a quote. The author, Larry K. Niksch, is cited in the footnote [78], at p. 66. The formatting should be:

• 2002: uranium program controversy

North Korea on 5 October 2002 acknowledged a uranium-based program.

The Bush Administration asserted on October 16, 2002, that North Korea had revealed to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang on October 5, 2002, that it had a secret nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. The program is based on the process of uranium enrichment, in contrast to North Korea’s pre-1995 nuclear program based on plutonium reprocessing.8


Page 83 Two lines from the bottom: Should be “are much harder,” not “is much harder.”

Page 104 Seven lines from the bottom: Should be “The problem of enforcement,” not “The problem enforcement.”

Page 136 In line 9, change “widelyillustrated” to “widely illustrated.” And in line 10, change “democraticallyelected” to “democratically elected.”

Page 225 The subhead at the top of the page should be in the same font as others. Hence:

**Australia’s Sponsorship of the Canberra Commission**
*(24 October 1995)*

Page 232 The words “while recommendations 47-53 concern export controls. Topics 54-60 address” should be set as regular text, like the words “Recommendations 43-46 … ” above it. The words are not apt of the bulleted reference to “WMD delivery means … .” It should read:

Recommendations 43-46 are germane to nuclear weapons, under the heading

- WMD delivery means, missile defences, and weapons in space;

while recommendations 47-53 concern export controls. Topics 54-
60 address

- compliance, verification, enforcement and the role of the United Nations.³¹

Page 289  Line 6. Should be “We canvassed objections,” not “we gave canvassed objections.”

Page 290  Thirteen lines from the bottom: should be no quotation mark after ‘transparence’.

Page 309  The list of articles, beginning with “El Baradei,” was to be omitted. It appears as footnote 42 [page 312].

Page 312  In footnote 40, ‘nucleer’ should be ‘nuclear.’

Pages 330-331  In footnote 9, from the paragraph beginning “Substantial progress” to the end of the note at “outcome of the negotiations” is a quote from the source cited. It should be formatted in the same way that footnote 10 is formatted. Hence:

U.S. doubts about the Protocol were expressed during the Clinton Administration. In that vein Ambassador Donald Mahley, State Department Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Arms Control, testified before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans’ Affairs and International Relations (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives), on September 13, 2000 [Source: http://www.acronym.org.uk/50bwc.htm]:

Substantial progress has been made in Geneva over the past year toward achieving this goal. But the United States will not accept a Protocol that undermines rather than strengthens national and international efforts to address the BW threat.
There is much serious work still to be done. I will not try to catalog all of the outstanding issues. However, some of the most crucial include:

- How will on-site activities allow for the protection of both national security information not connected to biological weapons activity and commercial proprietary information of great intellectual and financial value to our industry?
- How will the Protocol protect the United States, with the largest biodefense program in the world, from having to reveal either the promising defensive capabilities we are exploring or the areas of vulnerability where we have not yet been able to find appropriate biodefense against a potential enemy?
- How will the United States be able to continue to work with like-minded states to stem the potential proliferation of biological weapons capability to states of concern by reducing, or at least complicating, their access to the equipment, technology, and materiel that would most easily be misappropriated for illicit purposes?

These and other questions must be answered constructively for the United States to be able to accept the outcome of the negotiations.

(Source: http://www.acronym.org.uk/50bwc.htm.)

Footnote 3. The final paragraph is mine, not a quotation from the Boutros-Ghali article, as is unmistakably clear from the context. Should be:


The answer is not to create a U.N. standing force, which would be impractical and inappropriate, but to extend
and make more systematic standby arrangements by which governments commit themselves to hold ready, at an agreed period of notice, specially trained units for peacekeeping service.

But the standing force judged “impractical and inappropriate” for U.N. peacekeeping could be prudent as one feature of collective security under ZNW. Or standby arrangements could stipulate prompt availability, more like that of NEST teams described above.

Footnote 12. The date should be 25 June 2007, not 2006.
Substantive Errata

Extensions

Chapter 3: The Concealed Clandestine Program Problem.

Smuggling of Fissile Material.

p. 54

Ron Suskind’s *The Way of the World* reports Suskind’s conversations with Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA specialist on access to fissile material. Mowatt-Larssen’s claims flesh out the discussion of uranium smugglers arrested in Georgia. Suskind makes the point that smugglers in 2003 and 2006 sprang from the same ring, despite Russian assurances after a first incident that the ring had been shut down:

Rolf has been involved in what may be the most harrowing of the incidents—integraly involved. In 2003, a package was delivered to him at CIA. A man was picked up crossing from Russia to Georgia with 170 grams of uranium; he said his customer was “a Muslim man.” A Georgian official friendly with CIA went to a courier service in Tbilisi. Uranium through the mail. Rolf’s CIA team got the package and tested it: 93 percent enriched. … CIA sent a few folks over to Georgia and soon traced the uranium to Novosibirsk [*sic*], the Siberian hub of nuclear production facilities. The Russians denied this publicly—said they knew nothing about the uranium’s origins—but privately told CIA that they were on the case. In fact, Putin told that to Bush in one of their calls. And a year or so later, Putin told Bush

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in another call that the Russians had wrapped up the conspiracy and plugged the uranium leak. Everyone felt satisfied. But then, in February 2006, there was another seizure in Georgia. Same thing; different guy. That presented a host of unsettling conclusions. Three years after this uranium-trafficking network was detected, and despite several assurances from Putin, it still had not been shut down. Three years, and the smuggling—from Novosibirsk—was still going on.

Chapter 33: Nuclear Security Project

pp. 235-238

On 30 June 2008 three former British Foreign Secretaries, Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, and David Owen, and a former NATO General-Secretary, George Robertson, urged steps toward nuclear disarmament and abolition. They describe the initiative of Shultz, Kissinger, Perry and Nunn, the Nuclear Security Project, as an “influential project”, and declare that__

Substantial progress towards a dramatic reduction in the world’s nuclear weapons is possible. The ultimate aspiration should be to have a world free of nuclear weapons. It will take time, but with political will and improvements in monitoring, the goal is achievable. We must act before it is too late, and we can begin by supporting the campaign in America for a non-nuclear weapons world.³

This is a useful contribution, coming as it does from those who have doubtless given thought to the nuclear dilemma over years of senior service. It will be welcomed by advocates of denuclearization.

Its authors substantive recommendations boil down to a handful, and without surprises. They call for (i) reduced US and Russian nuclear weapons, (ii) the START regime ‘being extended’, (iii) reaching ‘agreement’ between the US and Russia on missile

³ Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen, and George Robertson, "Start worrying and learn to ditch the bomb. It won’t be easy, but a world free of nuclear weapons is possible." Times [London], 2008.06.30.

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defence, (iv) improved stockpile security, (v) ‘overhaul’ of the NPT, including strengthened monitoring of compliance and NPT adherents’ acceptance of the INFCIRC/540 Additional Protocol, (vi) bringing the CTBT into effect, and (vii) “mechanisms to provide those nations wishing to develop a civilian nuclear capability with the assistance and co-operation of those states that possess advanced expertise and that are able to provide nuclear fuel, spent-fuel management assistance, enriched uranium and technical assistance.”

The proposals are sketchy and difficult issues evaded. They suggest nothing about how Washington and Moscow are to reconcile their differences on missile defense; and they take no position, aye or nay, about the wisdom of Washington’s insistence on what many consider a provocation rooted in US domestic politics. They seem to adopt the view—but maybe not—that Iran should give up its drive for uranium enrichment and accept instead assurances of ‘assistance and cooperation’ from nuclear suppliers. Most worrisome, they several times declare their present aim ‘reduction’ of nuclear weapons and concede that nuclear abolition is an ‘ultimate aspiration’ which ‘will take time.’ An observer accustomed to nuclear weapon states’ having solemnly declared their wish for the ‘eventual’ or ‘ultimate’ end to nuclear weapons, while the concrete measures they undertake only extend the nuclearist status quo, will seek assurance that the four distinguished statesmen are bent on making ‘time’ as short as their insistence that the world is “at the brink of a new and dangerous phase” would seem to require.

A skeptic might ask: Why do they not mention Pakistan, India, China, Israel, or North Korea? Why do they not ask that Pakistan, India, and Israel commit to the NPT? Why no deadlines, or at least a suggestive timeline? If not for concluding abolition, at least for concluding a plan to denuclearize?

Perhaps its authors would spell out, in a longer exercise, what else they would propose. Or they may wish to cast the widest net.
Revision History

This note first posted 13 October 2008. Formatting corrections were lodged on 20 April 2008 in a document from which many corrections were made, but those noted here inexplicably omitted.

2008.11.01

Addition of extension to Chapter 3, p. 54.

2009.03.10

Endnotes


ii Harald Müller et al. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, above, p. 141.


vi WMD Commission Report, pp. 188-204.

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