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Bush undertakes 5-day trip to Spain, NATO [Brussels], EU [Goteberg], Poland, and Slovenia. In Slovenia, he holds his first talks with Russian President Putin.
• New York Times Bush Runs Into Skepticism at NATO Over Missile Shield 2001.06.13
• New York Times Putin Urges Bush Not to Act Alone on Missile Shield 2001.06.17
• New York Times Putin Says Russia Would Counter US Shield 2001.06.19
• Le Monde Première rencontre Bush-Poutine : derrière les sourires, les désaccords 2001.06.19
Colin Powell doubts Putins missile-defense warning.
• New York Times Powell Dismisses Putin Warning on Missiles 2001.06.24
Bush sketches a missile-defense plan in speech at the National Defense University. [Full text.]
• New York Times reportage 2001.05.01
• New York Times military analysis 2001.05.02
• New York Times reportage 2001.05.02
• Richard Butler op-ed 2001.05.02
• Indian Government pre-speech alert 2001.05.02
• Guardian [UK] editorial 2001.05.02
EU delegation in North Korea. Kim Jong Il extends missile test moratorium to 2003, but refuses to abandon missile exports.
Rumsfeld calls for combining many US military space programs but stops short of advocating putting weapons in outer space. [The New York Times]
• New York Times reportage 2001.05.09
• Associated Press reportage 2001.05.10, citing Lt. Gen. Robert Foglesong, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations: If the policy decision is made to take our guns into space that will be decided by our civilian leadership.
Michael R. Gordon cites the ABM Treaty arguments as first signs of a far-reaching debate over whether the United States should simply abandon the business of negotiating strategic arms treaties.
• New York Times, Michael R. Gordon analysis 2001.05.09
[Selected excerpts, selection and aqua markup by Bruce Larkin. Or go to the full text.]
US President George W. Bush speech at NDU on missile defense. [Excerpts]
We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.
We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past.
No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.
This new framework must encourage still further cuts in nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies.
We can and will change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over. I'm committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.
My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world.
Several months ago, I asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to examine all available technologies and basing modes for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, our friends and our allies. The secretary has explored a number of complementary and innovative approaches.
The secretary has identified near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats. In some cases, we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land- based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter the atmosphere.
We also recognize the substantial advantages of intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost phase. The preliminary work has produced some promising options for advanced sensors and interceptors that may provide this capability. If based at sea or on aircraft, such approaches could provide limited but effective defenses.
We have more work to do to determine the final form the defenses might take. We will explore all of these options further. We recognize the technological difficulties we face, and we look forward to I've made it clear from the very beginning that I would consult closely on the important subject with our friends and allies, who are also threatened by missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
This treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other countries.
That's why we should work together to replace this treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.
This new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past. It should be reassuring, rather than threatening. It should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense.
It should allow us to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability and its capability to defend its people and territory. And perhaps one day, we can even cooperate in a joint defense.
I want to complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests. We may have areas of difference with Russia, but we are not and must not be strategic adversaries.
Russia and America both face new threats to security. Together, we can address today's threats and pursue today's opportunities. We can explore technologies that have the potential to make us all safer.
This is a time for vision, a time for a new way of thinking, a time for bold leadership. The Looking Glass no longer stands its 24- hour-a-day vigil. We must all look at the world in a new, realistic way to preserve peace for generations to come.
God bless. (APPLAUSE)
Bush. NMD. 2001.05.01.
Indian Government 2001.05.02
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