

Appendix B

Distilling Denuclearization: Selected Texts and Statements [2006-2011]

Bruce D. Larkin [editor]

It's one thing to talk about 'getting rid of the bomb' or 'nuclear abolition', but quite another to follow arguments, and make judgments, about how to do it. Texts, declarations, remarks seem to stand alone. Rarely does one text engage the positions or arguments of others. Some speak to the short term, others to a 'long process'. Some are laundry lists, others focus on a single defined problem, or a handful. There are exceptions. The Carnegie Endowment volume *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, gives voice to multiple approaches, and concludes with an explicitly comparative essay by editors George Perkovich and James M. Acton.¹

This Appendix is a tool to help locate arguments and appreciate how they differ, especially about steps to take and the time required. Entries are listed chronologically.

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES		
STATE	DATE	NOTE
Britain	2009.02.24 2009.03.17	<i>Lifting the Nuclear Shadow.</i> Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Remarks.
China	2009.01.20	<i>China's National Defense in 2008.</i>
France	2008.06	Livre Blanc.
India	2009.05.29	CD. Remarks of Ambassador Hamid Ali Rao.
Israel		
North Korea		
Pakistan	2009.06.04	CD. Remarks of Ambassador Zamir Akram.
Russia	2009.04.01	Medvedev-Obama Joint Statement.

¹ George Perkovich and James M. Acton [eds.], *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).

United States	2009.04.01 2009.04.05	Medvedev-Obama Joint Statement. President Barack Obama. Remarks in Prague.
OTHER SELECTED TEXTS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE		
Evans	2009.04.07	Gareth Evans, Co-chair, International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament
IPFM	2009.10	International Panel on Fissile Materials. <i>Global Fissile Material Report 2009</i> .
ICNND	2009.12.15	<i>Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament</i>

STATEMENTS BY FORMER AND CURRENT OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN THEIR PRIVATE CAPACITIES		
US:	2007.01.04 2008.01.15 2010.01.24	United States: Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn op-ed. United States: Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn op-ed. United States: Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn op-ed.
UK:	2008.06.30	United Kingdom: Hurd, Rifkind, Owen, and Robertson op-ed.
Italy:	2008.07.24	Italy: D'Alema, Fini, La Malfa, Parisi, and Calogero, op-ed.
Germany:	2009.01.09	Germany: Schmidt, von Weizsäcker, Bahr and Genscher, op-ed.
Norway:	2009.06.03	Norway: Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch, Bondevik and Stoltenberg.
France:	2009.10.15	France: Juppé, Rocard, Richard, and Norlain op-ed.
Netherlands:	2009.11.23	Netherlands: Lubbers, van der Stoep, van Mierlo and Altes
Belgium:	2010.02.19	Belgium: Claes, Dehaene, Michel and Verhofstadt op-ed
Russia:	2010.10.15	Russia: Primakov, Ivanov, Velikhov and Moiseev.

The study guide is an index to salient texts, not a substitute for consulting the texts themselves. Highlighting has been applied by the editor.

This study guide is open to *ongoing revision*. You may wish to check whether this is the most recent version. Citation should specify the *revision date*, shown in the header line.

Bruce D. Larkin [ed]: Selected Texts and Statements [2006-2011]

2006.06.01 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (“Blix Commission”)

Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms (Stockholm: WMD Commission, 1 June 2006).

The full text of the report, and the texts of forty-one expert studies contributed to the Commission, are at <http://www.wmdcommission.org>

The report is organized in 60 discrete recommendations. Nuclear proposals are under four headings: preventing proliferation, preventing nuclear terrorism, reducing the threat and number of nuclear weapons, and then moving from regulation to prohibition. Recommendation 30 is that “[a]ll states possessing nuclear weapons should commence planning for security without nuclear weapons ...” and prepare to outlaw them.

2007.01.04 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn

“A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”

Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007. http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/01/04_shultz_free.htm Shultz and Kissinger are former US Secretaries of State, and are Republicans. Perry is a former US Secretary of Defense, Nunn a former US Senator and the cofounder of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; both are Democrats.

The text reads, in part:

What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort

should be launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages.

First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.

The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include:

- Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
- Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.
- Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.
- Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.
- Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
- Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.
- Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe.
- Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.

Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples. ...

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.

2007.06.25 United Kingdom: Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket

“*A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?*”. Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Conference. Washington, D. C.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2007conference/transcripts/keynote.pdf>

She said “The judgment we made 40 years ago that the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons was in all of our interests is just as true today as it was then.”

2008.01.15 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn

“*Toward a Nuclear Free World*”

Wall Street Journal, 2008.01.15.

This article pursues the authors’ op-ed of a year earlier.

While emphasising near-term measures, they wrote that “Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal. ... Without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.”

At a conference in Oslo, Norway in February 2008 Shultz insisted that “We cannot wait for a nuclear Pearl Harbor or 9.11. We must get ahead of the game to prevent an even more catastrophic event. So wake up everybody! The danger is real.” [National Public Radio, Morning Edition, 29 February 2008.]

2008.02.05 United Kingdom: Secretary of State for Defense Des Browne

“Laying the Foundations for Nuclear Disarmament.” Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 2008.02.05

<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20080205layingTheFoundationsForMultilateralDisarmament.htm>

He said, in part: “I am proposing to host a conference for technical experts from all five recognised nuclear states, to develop technologies for nuclear disarmament. ... The UK is determined to have a world free of nuclear weapons. But to get there we must first create an international environment that better supports disarmament. The UK has and will continue to pursue this until nuclear weapons no longer exist.”

2008.03.21 French President Nicholas Sarkozy spoke in Cherbourg at the launch of SNLE ‘Le Terrible’, addressing French nuclear policy.

Text [French] and Video: http://www.elysee.fr/documents/index.php?mode=cvview&cat_id=7&press_id=1198&lang=fr

Text [English]: <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-speech-at-10430.html>

See also Laurent Zecchini, “Nicolas Sarkozy recadre la doctrine nucléaire française”, *Le Monde*, Mis à jour le 21.03.08 | 09h48.

2008.06.30 United Kingdom: Former foreign secretaries Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, and David Owen, and former NATO General-Secretary George Robertson

“Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb. It won’t be easy, but a world free of nuclear weapons is possible.” *Times* [London], 2008.06.30.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece

Excerpt: “Substantial progress towards a dramatic reduction in the world’s nuclear weapons is possible. The ultimate aspiration should be to have a world free of nuclear weapons. It will take time, but with political will and improvements in monitoring, the goal is achievable. We must act before it is too late, and we can begin by supporting the campaign in America for a non-nuclear weapons world.”

2008.06

France. *Défense et Sécurité Nationale. Le Livre Blanc.*

France. Commission du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale. *Défense et Sécurité Nationale. Le Livre Blanc.* (Paris: Odile Jacob/La Documentation Française, June 2008).

<http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/084000341/index.shtml#>

Among recent French statements on nuclear disarmament, from which abolition is conspicuously absent, is the *Livre Blanc sur la Défense*, issued in June 2008.

Enfin, la France est engagée en faveur du désarmement nucléaire. Elle a été le premier État, avec le Royaume-Uni, à avoir signé et ratifié le traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires. Elle a été le premier État à décider la fermeture et le démantèlement de ses installations de production de matières fissiles à des fins explosives. Elle est le seul État à avoir démantelé, de manière transparente, son site d'essais nucléaires situé dans le Pacifique. Elle a démantelé ses missiles nucléaires sol-sol. Elle a réduit volontairement d'un tiers le nombre de ses sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d'engins. Au nom du principe de stricte suffisance, le nombre d'armes nucléaires, de missiles, et d'avions de la composante aéroportée sera également réduit d'un tiers à partir de 2008 (cf. chapitre 10). Avec cette réduction, l'arsenal nucléaire français comprendra moins de 300 têtes, soit la moitié du nombre maximum de têtes possédées par la France durant la guerre froide.

Le 21 mars 2008, la France a, de plus, proposé un plan ambitieux en matière de poursuite du désarmement nucléaire multilatéral. Elle encourage le respect de trois principes : suffisance, transparence et réciprocité.²

These particulars are then cited:

Désarmement nucléaire :

le plan d'action proposé par la France

- Ratification par tous les États du traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (la Chine et les États-Unis l'ont signé en 1996 mais ne l'ont pas encore ratifié).
- Engagement des puissances nucléaires à démanteler tous leurs sites d'essais nucléaires, de manière transparente et ouverte à la communauté internationale.

². *Défense et Sécurité Nationale. Le Livre Blanc*, pp. 120-121. June 2008.

- Lancement sans délai de la négociation sur un traité d'interdiction de la production de matières fissiles pour les armes nucléaires.
 - Moratoire immédiat sur la production de ces matières.
 - Adoption de mesures de transparence sur leurs arsenaux par les cinq puissances nucléaires reconnues par le traité de non-prolifération.
 - Ouverture de négociations sur un traité interdisant les missiles sol-sol de portée courte et intermédiaire.
 - Adhésion de tous les États et engagement à mettre en oeuvre le code de conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques.³
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2008.07.24 Italy. Four distinguished former and current public officials and a distinguished Italian physicist speak to the issues raised by Shultz et al.: Massimo D'Alema, former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Gianfranco Fini, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and currently President of the Italian Parliament; Giorgio La Malfa, MP, former Minister of European Affairs; Arturo Parisi, former Minister of Defence; and Francesco Calogero, theoretical physicist, and from 1989 to 1997 Secretary General of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995.

An English version of the text is at http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo09/doc/calogero_TowardsNFWF080918.pdf For the original Italian text, see http://www.corriere.it/cronache/08_luglio_24/mondo_senza_armi_nucleari_ba381db8-594a-11dd-94cb-00144f02aabc.shtml, *Il Corriere della Sera* 24 July 2008.

2008.11 Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, "The Logic of Zero," *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2008.

Excerpt:

... the next president will have an opportunity to make the elimination of all nuclear weapons the organizing principle of U.S. nuclear policy.

³. *Défense et Sécurité Nationale. Le Livre Blanc*, p. 121. June 2008.

Setting a vision of this kind is vitally important, but it is not enough. What is also needed is a strategic logic that explains how the world can get there from here. It involves four major steps, each difficult but feasible. First, Washington must establish as official policy the limited purpose of U.S. nuclear forces: to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others. Other purposes are no longer realistic or necessary for the United States. Second, given this limited purpose of its nuclear weapons, the United States should reduce its nuclear arsenal to no more than 1,000 total weapons. This would be more than enough to convince anyone that the United States possesses the capacity to respond to any use of nuclear weapons with devastating effect. Third, the United States must work to put in place a comprehensive international nuclear-control regime that goes well beyond the present nonproliferation regime's accounting and monitoring of nuclear materials. It must include all fissile materials and provide an airtight verification system to enable the world to move from thousands of nuclear weapons to hundreds, to tens, and ultimately to zero.

Finally, Washington must launch a vigorous diplomatic effort to convince the world of the logic of zero -- and of the benefits of taking the difficult steps necessary to get there. This effort should start with its closest and most important allies, then include other nonnuclear states who have long called for such an initiative, and ultimately encompass all nuclear states. U.S. leadership of this international effort will be crucial. And a willingness to act boldly to reduce its own reliance on nuclear weapons and drastically cut its own arsenal can give Washington the credibility necessary to succeed.

2009.01.09

Germany: »Für eine atomwaffenfreie Welt«, jointly authored by: Helmut Schmidt, a Social Democrat, was chancellor 1974-1982; Richard von Weizsäcker, a Christian Democrat, was president 1984-1994; Egon Bahr, a minister in Social Democratic governments, was an architect of the policy of "ostpolitik"; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, of the Free Democrats, was foreign minister 1974-1992.

A German original is at <http://deutsche-literaturgesellschaft.de/HelmutSchmidt.php?categoryID=> attributing copyright to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

See the comment of Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier "A Fresh Start for Disarmament Policy," 4 February 2009, in English at <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/636/457297/text/>

The New York Times published the text on 13 January 2009 under the title "Toward a nuclear-free world: a German view," at

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/opinion/09iht-edschmidt.1.19226604.html>

2009.01.20 China: State Council.

China's National Defense in 2008. 2009.01.20.

http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_2.htm

Excerpt: “China holds that all nuclear-weapon states should make an unequivocal commitment to the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, undertake to stop research into and development of new types of nuclear weapons, and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policy.”

2009.02.24 United Kingdom: Foreign Secretary David Miliband

“Lifting the Nuclear Shadow”

United Kingdom. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. *LIFTING THE NUCLEAR SHADOW: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/nuclear-paper> 2009.02.04. Also see United Kingdom. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. [Summary](http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/counter-terrorism/weapons/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-paper/). <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/counter-terrorism/weapons/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-paper/> 2009.02.04.

The paper is simply worded, a summary of UK declaratory policy on nuclear disarmament. It continues the position outlined by then Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket speaking in Washington in June 2007. Abolition of nuclear weapons is treated as an objective, but an ‘ultimate’ goal, before which a number of daunting prerequisites must be met. The paper also paraphrases positions which illustrate the range of different views among specialists and public, enabling it to suggest complexity without being required to resolve it. The paper’s helpfulness is in setting out three general conditions and a number of germane steps which could be taken in endeavoring to meet obstacles.

2009.03.00 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: George Perkovich and James M. Acton

Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009). Incorporates George Perkovich and James M. Acton, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, Adelphi Paper 396, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pubs>

The original Perkovich-Acton paper asks “How might the security conditions which would permit nuclear weapons to be safely prohibited be created, and how might measures to implement such a prohibition be verified and enforced?”⁴ They assert that think tanks should be “venturesome” and “offer policies and procedures for verifying and enforcing a global prohibition on nuclear weapons.” But they are skeptical that abolition could be within reach, or a ‘date certain’ set: “Global nuclear disarmament is too far beyond the horizon for leaders of the US, Russia, China, France, the UK, Israel, India and Pakistan to form a consensus now on how and when it would be achieved.”⁵ They address a selection of central topics: political preconditions, verification, implications of civil nuclear power, enforcement, and residual assets (hedge stocks, expertise, reconstitution). The eighteen commentators’ essays are concise, focused statements of views, illustrating how diverse approaches to nuclear abolition, and preconditions on which some would insist, can be.

2009.03.17

United Kingdom: Prime Minister Gordon Brown

“Speech on nuclear energy and proliferation”. Transcript [check against delivery]. 2009.03.17.

<http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page18631>

Gordon Brown delivered a speech on nuclear policy promising to release “Road to 2010” proposals in the coming summer, a “credible roadmap towards disarmament by all the nuclear weapon states.” But Brown emphasises conditions to be met before reaching “the ultimate ambition of a world free from nuclear weapons”:

“So in the coming months Britain—working with other countries—will be setting out a ‘Road to 2010’ Plan with detailed proposals on civil nuclear power, disarmament and non-proliferation, on fissile material security and the role and development of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We will be seeking the widest possible international engagement and consultation around this plan. ... We will also host a recognised nuclear weapons state conference on nuclear disarmament issues and confidence building measures, including the verification of disarmament.”

2009.04.00

Natural Resources Defense Council: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich

⁴ *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, p. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons (Washington: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2009). Occasional Paper No. 7. April 2009.

<http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/doctrine/targeting.pdf>

Excerpts: “The logic, content, and procedures of the current employment policy are relics of the Cold War and, if not changed, will hinder the hoped-for deep cuts to the nuclear stockpile and the longer term goal of elimination. This report argues that, as long as the United States continues these nuclear missions unjustifiably held over from the Cold War, nuclear weapons will contribute more to the nation’s and the world’s insecurity than they contribute to their security. And without those Cold War justifications, there is only one job left for nuclear weapons: to deter the use of nuclear weapons.” The authors propose focused “infrastructure targeting” and explain that “a minimal nuclear deterrence policy and posture with infrastructure targeting does not require nuclear forces to be on alert, to be configured for preemption, or to even retaliate quickly.” Implications follow for the size and capacity of the US nuclear stockpile.

2009.04.01 Russian Federation and the United States: President Dmitriy Medvedev and President Barack Obama

Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America” issued after their meeting on the sidelines of the G20 conference in London. 2009.04.01.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America/

The statement said, in part: “We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations.”

2009.04.05 United States: President Barack Obama.

Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/

Excerpt: “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, ‘Yes, we can.’ (Applause.)

“ Now, let me describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. . . . ”

2009.04.07

International Commission on Nuclear

Nonproliferation and Disarmament: Co-chair Gareth Evans

At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., 6-7 April 2009, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans contributed remarks anticipating directions which the Commission may follow in its forthcoming report. The panel was titled “The Nuclear Order: Build or Break.” 2009.04.07.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1313&prog=zgp>

Evans posits a ‘short term’ ending in 2012, and specifies steps he hopes are completed before and during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. He chooses 2025 as the year before which the move to actual abolition is unlikely, and sets out measures to be undertaken in the years leading to 2025. Of abolition he insists that

It’s important, in the middle of all this realism, however, about getting to the beyond 2025 final zero, to keep our basic idealism intact. The ultimate goal must remain one – the ultimate goal that we must never lose sight of is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the effective outlawing of nuclear weapons from the planet.

The rationale for that goal I think must again also never be lost sight of. It was very well articulated I think by the original Canberra Commission and rearticulated as the central motif of the Blix Commission, namely that so long as any country has nuclear weapons, others will want them; so long as any country has nuclear weapons, they’re bound one day to be used by accident if not design, and any such use would be catastrophic.

The short-term aims and hopes include CTBT ratification before the NPT Review Conference, ‘rearticulation’ of the 13 Steps of the 2000 NPT Review, and measures to strengthen the NPT. For 2009-2010 he lists several agenda items: START follow-on, strategic dialogue with Russia and China, CTBT,

Bruce D. Larkin [ed]: Selected Texts and Statements [2006-2011]

fissile material control, securing loose materials, Iran and the DPRK, and US nuclear policy (including acknowledgment that deterrence is the only nuclear mission).

Medium-term aims:

In terms of the medium term, which for present purposes we're thinking about as the period running through to about 2025, the basic object, as we're thinking about it again at the moment, is to both set and get to a target, minimalist vantage point – we're still wrestling with the appropriate metaphor but I'll leave that discussion to one side – a minimalist vantage point which would be characterized by dramatically reduced numbers of warheads, and we're still debating what those numbers should be, whether it's possible to have any actual numbers or would it only be a formula, but certainly dramatically reduced; secondly, dramatically reduced deployment of any of the weapons left in existence; thirdly, nothing anywhere on high readiness – on high launch readiness; and fourthly, common acceptance in military doctrine that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others.

Again, whether or not no-first-use should be part of that kind of military doctrine or whether that's an add-on or more emotional and real-world utility is something the commission is wrestling with. But we believe, I think in our preliminary discussions, that getting to a result like this with very low numbers, very little actual deployment, nothing on high readiness, and a common doctrine accepting that there's no other purpose for these things in their potential use of tools other than to deter others from using nuclear weapons, we think that that would be a very much better world than the one we have at the moment, and one that is achievable within a time certain by a date certain, and for present purposes, 2025 seems to be workable.

2009.04 Council on Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy. William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft, chairs.

Council on Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy."

The 23 task force members, for the most part former US government officials, "are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse 'the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.'" Two, Ashton B. Carter and Michèle A. Flournoy, have assumed positions in the Obama administration.

Does the Report break new ground? Not exactly. It is an orderly, accessible canvass of steps about which there is wide agreement they should be undertaken: ratifying the CTBT and conducting a security dialogue with Russia,

Bruce D. Larkin [ed]: Selected Texts and Statements [2006-2011]

for example. It neither urges nor rejects measures, such as providing for the ‘reliable replacement warhead’, for which *status quo* nuclearists have been campaigning. It gives at most passing attention to ZNW, complete denuclearization. Crafting a consensus document must have been a difficult task. The result is a text that avoids hard questions—such as ‘how can abolition be brought about?’—and achieves an anodyne survey of centrist recommendations.

A few task force members submitted ‘additional or dissenting views.’ George Perkovich comments that

“the discussion of the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons does not persuasively make the case for their role beyond deterring threats to national survival, nor does it make the case for the need to develop new nuclear weapons, an option that the report does not exclude.”⁶

and John Deutch finds several of the Report’s conclusions “compelling”, including that

“(4) the United States must engage Russia and China on nuclear issues if progress is to be made on reducing stockpiles and slowing proliferation, for example by Iran and North Korea; (5) preventing or reversing a country’s move toward the bomb is best achieved by addressing the country’s security concerns; coercive international agreements are secondary;”⁷

What language does the Report adopt to address two bellwether issues, the RRW and abolition? Its preface begins, after all, citing President Obama’s remarks in Prague on 5 April 2009, and the “U.S. commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons.” The Report’s treatment is dismissive:

“The question of whether and how to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons has emerged as a central foreign policy issue. But that vision remains just a vision. President Obama himself has acknowledged that ‘this goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime.’”⁸

“Although Task Force members disagreed on the practicality and desirability of eventual nuclear abolition, the report supports deeper reduction in U.S. and Russian arsenals.”⁹

“[Two cited] studies also point out that progress toward disarmament, even if abolition is not attainable, would shore up allies’ support for a stronger nonproliferation regime.”¹⁰

6. Report, pp. 98-99.

7. Report, p. 97.

8. Report, p. XXX.

9. Report, pp. ix-x.

10. Report, p. 13.

“Task Force members have differing views on the feasibility or even desirability of achieving the global elimination of nuclear weapons, but all agree that, if feasible, abolition will likely require decades to accomplish. ... [S]upporting the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament may be necessary to mobilize widespread support for the short-term actions needed to further reduce nuclear dangers.”¹¹

“Recognizing that the political conditions that will lead to abolition are rather daunting, the United States can still lead on this objective by having serious discussions about conditions for achieving further nuclear arms reductions. It can put the onus on itself and all countries interested in disarmament to provide insights about necessary political, security, and technical preconditions.”¹²

In short, there is some deference to abolition as a goal, but it is scant.

What of the ‘reliable replacement warhead’? The Task Force characterizes the views of supporters and skeptics.¹³ It then states that

“Any new warhead designs should meet four criteria: no required new nuclear testing, no additional military capabilities, enhanced safety and security features, and enough confidence in the designs and manufacturing processes to allow for deep reductions in reserve warheads.”¹⁴

More subtly, there are more than a few references in the report to maintaining a “safe, secure and reliable deterrent force.”¹⁵ Of course no one advocates an unsafe, insecure, and unreliable deterrent, but invoking ‘reliability’ might be read by some as coded support for the RRW. In short, the Report treads carefully on the RRW and the related question of transforming the nuclear weapons complex. Its recommendations are carefully prudent, and limited.

2009.05.29

Remarks of the Ambassador of India, Hamid Ali Rao, to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 29 May 2009.

Online, via United Nations Office at Geneva. Disarmament. Conference on Disarmament. Statements at Plenary Sessions (2009). <http://www.unog.ch/>

Excerpts:

11. Report, p. 20, after citing Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama on abolition.

12. Report, p. 50.

13. Report, pp. 77-78.

14. Report, p. 79. See also Report, pp. 91-92.

15. E.g. Report, pp. ix, xiv, xv, 5, 8, 56, 67, 76, 78, 81, 91, 92. On p. 77 the citation to ‘safe, secure, and reliable’ notes the annual formal certification of the stockpile.

4. India attaches the highest priority to the goal of nuclear disarmament., Speaking at the UNGA on 26 September, 2008, our Prime Minister reiterated India's proposal for a Nuclear Weapon's Convention for banning the production, development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and to provide for their complete elimination within a specified time frame. This is consistent with India's longstanding commitment put forward in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan in 1988. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national security and will remain so pending the global elimination of all nuclear weapons on a universal, non-discriminatory basis. An FMCT would be a step towards this goal.

5. While joining the consensus on this Programme of Work, we wish to place on record our disappointment that the Conference could not decide on launching negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We feel that there is a heavy responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, to respond meaningfully to growing international opinion in favour of Nuclear Disarmament. While India has gone along with the establishment of Working Group to exchange views and information on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their elimination, we believe that the CD should continue to actively explore all possible avenues to advance the Conference's work for actual commencement on negotiations on nuclear disarmament. CD/1863 does in fact include the possibility of future negotiations and we believe that the CD should take concrete steps in that direction.

2009.06.03

Odvar Nordli, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Kåre Willoch, Kjell Magne Bondevik and Thorvald Stoltenberg.

Odvar Nordli, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Kåre Willoch and Kjell Magne Bondevik are former Prime Ministers of Norway. Thorvald Stoltenberg is a former Foreign Minister of Norway. The text was originally published on 3 June 2009 by Aftenposten: <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/article3105200.ece> English translation from Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/06/04_norwegian_leaders_statement.php

Note their call for elimination of nuclear weapons facilities, as well as the weapons themselves. Full text:

Two years have passed since George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn revived the idea of a nuclear weapon-free world. In the

meantime, leaders from many other countries have joined in. President Obama has done the same. They have all referred to concrete measures that can bring us closer to the goal.

The four American leaders underlined the relationship between vision and action: "Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible". To create such a dynamic interplay, we have to be serious both about the vision and about the measures. We call on all to do so, as strongly as we can.

The goal must be a world where not only the weapons, but also the facilities that produce them are eliminated. All fissile materials for military ends must be destroyed, and all nuclear activities must be subject to strict international control.

The United States and Russia, which together account for more than 90 per cent of the world's arsenals, must take the first steps. They should reduce their arsenals to a level where the other nuclear weapon states may join in negotiations of global limitations. All agreements must be balanced and verifiable and provide enhanced security at lower levels of arms. While reductions are going on, mutual deterrence will remain a basic principle of international security.

tactical ones - must be included in the negotiations. We urge Russia, which has big arsenals of tactical weapons, to accept this.

Today, there is the risk that nuclear weapons will proliferate to more states as well as to non-state actors and terrorist networks. The latter want nuclear weapons in order to use them. Together with the US and many other countries, Norway has participated in programmes to control and destroy nuclear materials and ready-made weapons. A major increase in the funding for such programmes is urgently needed.

Establishment of missile shields should be avoided, for they stimulate rearmament. Nuclear powers which do not have such shields will seek countermeasures to maintain their retaliatory capabilities. Others fear that for those who have a shield, it will be easier to use the sword. Ongoing missile defence plans and programmes should therefore be subordinated to the work for comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

While new negotiations are set in motion, existing agreements must be maintained. That goes for the INF Treaty, which eliminated intermediate-range systems from Europe, and for the CFE agreement on conventional force reductions that was concluded as the Cold War drew to an end. Also, it goes for the American-Russian presidential initiatives of 1991/92 on withdrawal and

elimination of American and Russian tactical weapons. Above all, it goes for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which is currently under pressure. In connection with next year's review conference for the NPT, it is important to reconfirm the validity of the principles on which it is built: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Holding the chair of the seven-nation initiative, Norway may contribute to the successful conclusion of this conference.

2009.06.04 Remarks of the Ambassador of Pakistan, Zamir Akram, to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 4 June 2009.

Online, via United Nations Office at Geneva. Disarmament. Conference on Disarmament. Statements at Plenary Sessions (2009). <http://www.unog.ch/>

Excerpts:

The document CD/1863, even in its current form, is a litmus test for those who claim to champion the cause of nuclear disarmament and promote the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has demonstrated a persistent and principled commitment to general and complete disarmament, which is CD's raison, d'être. For peace and stability in South Asia, we worked hard to maintain conventional armaments at the lowest levels. Our pursuit of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region With overwhelming support in the UN was thwarted by the nuclear weapons tests conducted in May 1998. Pakistan was obliged to respond in order to ensure peace and stability in the region. And it has proven to be so. As a responsible nuclear weapons state, we have since maintained credible minimum mutual deterrence. We have proposed the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia that encompasses three inter-locked tiers of conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and a conventional balance.

Pakistan stresses once again that issues of peace and security and disarmament are inextricably linked. Security is indivisible. International peace and security and universal and nondiscriminatory disarmament can only be achieved meaningfully by addressing the asymmetries both in the nuclear and conventional fields that exist at the regional and sub-regional levels.

2009.06.10 President Putin's remarks.

Source: David Nowak, Associated Press, 2009.06.10. "Putin: Russia Might Abandon Nukes if Others Do"

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090610/ap_on_re_eu/eu_russia_putin_nuclear [Or see <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1010/42/378483.htm>]

Excerpts:

MOSCOW – Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Wednesday that Russia is willing to abandon nuclear weapons, if the United States and all other countries that have them do the same.

“If those who made the atomic bomb and used it are ready to abandon it — like, I hope, other nuclear powers officially and unofficially owning them — of course we will welcome and facilitate this process in all ways,” Putin said, according to state-owned RIA Novosti news agency.

Putin spoke at a meeting with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who said earlier that the idea of scrapping nuclear arms altogether rather than limiting their proliferation was a real prospect.

“The goal of global zero is not a game for utopians, but will be taken up by the doyens of U.S. foreign policy as well as by German and Polish politicians,” Steinmeier said. ...

2009.10

Global Fissile Material Report 2009. International Panel on Fissile Materials. <http://www.fissilematerials.org/>

2009.10.15

France. Former prime ministers Alain Juppé and Michel Rocard; former minister of defence Alain Richard; and former commandant of the French ‘force aérienne de combat’, General Bernard Norlain.

“Pour un désarmement nucléaire mondial, seule réponse à la prolifération anarchique”, *Le Monde*, 15 October 2009.

English: http://acdn.france.free.fr/spip/article.php3?id_article=553&lang=en

2009.11.23

Netherlands. The following, including source, identifications and explanation of a correction, is reproduced from the Pugwash site http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nuclear-weapons-free-statements/NFWF_statements_Netherlands.htm Because it incorporates

Bruce D. Larkin [ed]: Selected Texts and Statements [2006-2011]

a paragraph omitted from the original, I am reproducing it in full:

Published in *NRC Handelsblad*, 23 November 2009.

<http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/Veiligheid%20en%20Ontwapening/Nucleaire%20ontwapening/Lubbers%20et%20al%20auth%20version.pdf>

This is the authorized translation of an article first published in the Dutch daily newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* on 23 November 2009. A passage deleted from the first publication was restored through rectification two days later, and is included in this translation of the full original text.

“Toward A Nuclear Weapon Free World” by Ruud Lubbers, Max van der Stoel, Hans van Mierlo and Frits Korthals Altes.

Ruud Lubbers is a former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Max van der Stoel is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo is a former Minister of Defense and of Foreign Affairs, Frits Korthals Altes is a former Minister of Justice.

This autumn marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the UN Climate Change Conference, next month in Copenhagen. The first represents the end of the Cold War; the second a multi-polar world with "common but differentiated responsibilities".

President Obama has been in office for nearly a year. Since his inauguration, he has repeatedly stated that he considers a world without nuclear weapons to be necessary. Together with his Russian counterpart Dimitri Medvedev, he affirmed this in a statement in London last April. Four days later in Prague, Obama gave what has already become a historic speech, in which he called for a nuclear-weapon-free world and acknowledged the moral responsibility of the United States to take the lead in nuclear disarmament. Obama's initiative at the UN Security Council in September, where again he committed himself to the elimination of nuclear weapons, was another highly significant step. On this occasion, he also honored the four American security policy veterans (Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, George Shultz and William Perry) who, in a January 2007 opinion piece in the *Wall Street Journal*, broke with the Cold War logic of

deterrence. Looking back, this article was an essential turning point in the global debate on nuclear weapons. This celebrated initiative by the American 'Group of Four' was followed by similar initiatives in a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Norway and Poland. Two well-known names in this movement are Helmut Schmidt and Douglas Hurd. From the moment he took office, President Obama has joined their plea and thereby implicitly expressed a generally positive view of the 'Global Zero' movement, which was initiated in 2008 in the United States.

It is of critical importance that the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to be held in May 2010, be successful. This is why we believe that the Netherlands should explicitly express its support for the goal of a nuclear-free world, newly stated by President Obama. Our support is necessary because thus far neither NATO nor the EU have done so. In our view, the Netherlands should not be too modest. We are one of the 'founding fathers' of what now is the European Union. We were at the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From day one we have been party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). And we have a special nuclear record, both with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear technology (Urenco) and our participation in the nuclear tasks of NATO.

It is impossible to do away with the existing knowledge of nuclear technology. However, at the present time, it is both possible and important to use it responsibly. The Cold War is truly over; it ended twenty years ago. A nuclear arsenal to restrain superpowers is no longer needed. In combating terrorism, deterrence with weapons of mass destruction has no purpose. Let us be clear, not only did nuclear weapons give shape to the Cold War, the Cold War also shaped the control of nuclear weapons; and that reality has definitely come to an end. This is the main reason why the existence of nuclear weapons has become much more dangerous than before.

Reductions in and the eventual abolishment of nuclear weapons were codified in the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. However, the nuclear weapon states have interpreted Article VI in such a way that they have fulfilled their obligations only by reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult to explain why some countries should and others should not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. Of course, the abolition of nuclear weapons will take time. The primary responsibility lies with the two nuclear weapon states that have the largest arsenals: the United States and Russia. Presidents Obama and Medvedev have now taken the

initiative and, as their efforts become more visible, China, the United Kingdom and France must necessarily follow.

Has the Netherlands been too silent?

The Netherlands has a special reason to clearly and publicly declare itself in support of a world free of nuclear weapons in compliance with Article VI of the NPT. This particular reason is our position as the host of the International Court of Justice. We Dutch like to refer to The Hague as the 'World's Legal Capital'. The ICJ unanimously declared on 8 July 1996 that, "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

As a member of NATO, the Netherlands should also make itself clearly heard in the upcoming revision of NATO's Strategic Concept. We have gratefully benefitted from the nuclear protection of the United States. Now, we should once more play our part as allies in modernizing the Strategic Concept. By supporting President Obama in his goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons according to the faithful implementation of Article VI of the NPT, we can again show ourselves to be a strong ally.

Given the clear indications that the United States takes nuclear disarmament very seriously and that the original objective of deterrence has lost its validity, we need to ensure that neither the United States nor the other NATO allies wait for each other. The Netherlands should play an active role so that the revision of the Strategic Concept will lead to the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.

It is understandable and appropriate that after the events of September 11, 2001, much attention has been given to combating terrorism. This new security concern should be taken very seriously.

However, it is precisely because of this threat that there is all the more reason to reduce and ban nuclear weapons. Such weapons are useless in the battle against terrorism. In fact, their existence presents an increased risk precisely because there are terrorists. This alone calls for the urgent implementation of Article VI of the NPT, in accordance with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

Here too, the Netherlands has a special responsibility. We co-created Euratom and since then, with each new enlargement of the EU, each new Member State

hands over its fissile material to the EU.

The time has come for this system to enter into practice worldwide through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Finally, there is the role of Europe. The Lisbon Treaty strengthens the role of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This raises the question whether the High Representative could afford not to take a position on nuclear disarmament. This seems inconceivable, despite the reality of the United Kingdom and France as nuclear weapon states.

There are also the facts of the British security policy veterans Douglas Hurd and George Robertson (former Secretary General of NATO), and of a French President, Gaullist as he may be, who has declared himself in favor of a new multi-polar world and who has asked the former president of 'Médecins sans Frontières' to be his Minister of Foreign Affairs. In other words, it should be possible for the strengthened High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to express positions on this matter on behalf of Europe.

The significance of the action of the first 'Group of Four' (Kissinger, Nunn, Shultz and Perry) lies in the fact that during the time they held responsibilities inside the government, they used the threat of nuclear weapons as a means to maintain peace. Though it is unusual, we as 'policy veterans'" consider this to be the right moment to speak out and join our former colleagues in their call for a world without nuclear weapons.

2009.12.15 *Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Policymakers*. Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. Co-chairs: Gareth Evans and Kawaguchi Yoriko, respectively former foreign ministers of Australia and Japan.

<http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/index.html>

From their introductory web page (highlight added):

“Eliminating nuclear threats is a matter of necessity, not choice. The world’s 23,000 nuclear weapons – many still deployed on high alert – can destroy life on

this planet many times over. That the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has not so far been repeated owes far more to luck than to good policy management.

Even with the U.S. and Russia showing welcome new leadership, the policy challenges are immense. Every state with nuclear weapons has to be persuaded to give them up. States without nuclear weapons have to neither want nor be able to acquire them. Terrorists must be stopped from getting anywhere near them. And rapidly expanding peaceful nuclear energy use must be security risk-free.

This report, the work of an independent commission of global experts sponsored by Australia and Japan, seeks to guide global policymakers through this maze. It comprehensively maps both opportunities and obstacles, and shapes its many recommendations into a clearly defined set of short, medium and longer term action agendas.

The tone throughout is analytical, measured and hard-headedly realistic. But the ultimate ideal is never lost sight of: **so long as any nuclear weapons remain, the world can never be safe.**"

2010.01.24

United States: Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn op-ed.

"How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 January 2010.

2010.02.19

Belgium: Claes, Dehaene, Michel and Verhofstadt op-ed.

Willy Claes, ex-ministre des Affaires étrangères (SPA), ex-secrétaire général de l'Otan ;

Jean-Luc Dehaene, ex-Premier ministre de la Belgique (CD&V) , membre du Parlement Européen ;

Louis Michel, ex-ministre des Affaires Etrangères (MR), ex-commissaire européen, membre du Parlement européen ;

Guy Verhofstadt, ex-premier ministre de la Belgique (VLD), président de la fraction libérale au Parlement européen.

“Vers Un Monde Sans Armes Nucléaire,” *Le Soir*, 19 February 2010..

http://www.lesoir.be/forum/cartes_blanches/2010-02-19/vers-un-monde-sans-armes-nucleaires-754486.shtml

Excerpt: “Il est impossible de refuser aux autres Etats d’acquérir des armes nucléaires, aussi longtemps que nous-mêmes en disposons. Le choix est donc clair : un monde où on accepte que de plus en plus d’Etats produisent des armes nucléaires, ou bien un monde où les neuf puissances nucléaires actuelles renoncent fondamentalement à mettre l’accent sur les armes nucléaires et prennent au sérieux l’objectif de les éliminer.”

2010.10.15 **Yevgeny Primakov, Igor Ivanov, Yevgeny Velikhov, Mikhail Moiseev.**

Yevgeny Primakov, Head of the Government of the Russian Federation (1998-1999), Foreign Minister (1996-1998), Member of the Academy of Sciences, Member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1998-2004), Secretary of the Security Council (2004-2007), Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO)

Yevgeny Velikhov, President of the Russian Scientific Center Kurchatov Institute, Member of the Academy of Sciences, Member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Mikhail Moiseev, Chief of General Staff, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union (1988-1991), General of the Army

“From Nuclear Deterrence to Universal Security,” published originally in *Izvestia*, 15 October 2010; English version in *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, 28 October 2010. http://rbth.ru/articles/2010/10/28/from_nuclear_deterrence_universal_security05073.html

For another translation, see “Nuclear disarmament: the end of the atomic option,” *Telegraph* (London), 8 December 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/8188782/Nuclear-disarmament-the-end-of-the-atomic-option.html>

The original can be found in *Izvestia*, 15 October 2010: <http://izvestia.ru/politic/article3147325/>

Full text

In 2010, important events in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have had a positive impact on the strengthening of international security.

The presidents of Russia and the United States signed a new START treaty in Prague. When the treaty is ratified, strategic relations between the two nuclear powers will become more sustainable, transparent and predictable.

The multilateral Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, resulted in decisions on improving the security of nuclear materials in the world. The regular Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference successfully led to an adoption of the Final Document, which calls for measures to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its regime and related institutions.

Undoubtedly, all these measures are quite helpful, but so far they have not touched upon the principle of mutual nuclear deterrence. The paradox of nuclear deterrence is that it is by nature backward looking—it is aimed at the threats of the past century. Today, however, the possibility of a major armed conflict between the largest world powers and their allies in our increasingly globalized and multipolar world is close to zero.

Nuclear deterrence is impotent in the face of the new threats of the 21st century, namely: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, international terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, and trans-border crime. Moreover, in some cases, nuclear deterrence encourages the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, or impedes deeper cooperation between powers in their struggle against these threats (for example, the joint development of anti-ballistic missile systems.)

So that nuclear deterrence will not get in the way of cooperation between the main players on the global stage, it is necessary to continue negotiations to bring down the militarization level. These negotiations must be based on the minimum sufficiency principle, must strengthen strategic stability by ensuring equal and universal security for all parties, and must exclude the possibility of a first strike due to technical failure, a faulty assessment of intentions of the other party or lack of time for making decisions by the political leadership. The START Treaty meets these needs, but there is a lot to yet be done in this area.

The next stage of nuclear disarmament cannot be just bilateral. Restrictions and confidence measures will be required with regards to the third-party nuclear states. In contrast with the United States, Russia's geostrategic location makes it reachable by weapons from all nuclear states. This fact cannot be overlooked during any further major nuclear disarmament.

The concept of nuclear deterrence has turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle on the long and hard road to total nuclear disarmament. Everyone knows that there are both supporters and opponents of nuclear disarmament in the United States, Russia and other countries. Although some are simply holding on to the ideological stereotypes of the Cold War, there are many who

voice specific and reasonable concerns in relation to this process. Their arguments should not be brushed aside; in fact, they should be taken into account in order to lift the existing barriers to further deep nuclear arms cuts.

In Russia, for example, there is a widely felt sentiment that the nuclear potential of the country is a major attribute of Russia's status as a world power, without which its foreign policy interests will not be taken seriously—neither by the United States, nor other countries.

We are confident that the status of Russia in the world will mostly be defined by its level of economic modernization, improved living standards, social and political rights and freedoms of its population, and scientific and cultural developments. Unfortunately, while such measures as the projection of force and its direct application are used in international relations, Russia will have to maintain a relatively high level of military readiness and nuclear potential to protect itself and its allies and defend its legitimate interests.

Thus, the way to nuclear disarmament is through the building of mutual trust and the strengthening of international security and stability. The Obama Administration has reaffirmed the United States' commitment to multilateral action. This commitment includes: ensuring international security and strengthening its legal framework and existing institutions; the supremacy of diplomacy in resolving complicated controversial issues; and a partnership with Russia based on the principle of equality. It is crucial that these principles are realized in practice in the foreign policy of the United States and its allies.

These principles are equally relevant for anti-missile defense, ordinary weapons and non-nuclear strategic delivery vehicles, as well as militarization plans for outer space. But these and other areas of arms reduction will require extra far-reaching, trust-boosting measures.

In the longer term, we believe that a world without nuclear weapons does not equal the world as it is just without the weapons. An international system built on substantially different principles and institutions is needed. A world free of nuclear weapons should not become one where other weapons of mass destruction, conventional armed forces, state-of-the-art non-nuclear weapons and systems based on new physical principles are used for waging wars.

This new world must also consider the role played by local conflicts as well as large-scale wars. Now, smaller countries regard nuclear weapons as a way to balance out the huge dominance of the leading powers. This is indeed one of the motivations behind nuclear proliferation at the regional level, which increases the threat of nuclear terrorism. The removal of such threats will require robust international mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of all types of conflicts.

That is why implementation of the strategic goal of nuclear disarmament is only possible with a serious overhaul of the international system in general.

Without a doubt, it would help to resolve other key issues of the 21st century, such as those related to the global economy, energy supply, the environment, climate change, demographics, epidemics, trans-border crimes and religious and ethnical extremism.

In this context, nuclear disarmament is not an end in itself; rather, it is one of the most important prerequisites for reorganizing the international community literally on a more civilized basis and in accordance with the needs of the new century.

От ядерного сдерживания к общей безопасности

Настало время выходить на новый этап разоружения, реализовывать принцип многосторонности действий, что станет важным шагом к формированию нового мирового порядка для XXI века



Июль

1946 года, атолл Бикини в Тихом океане. США испытывают атомную бомбу. Всего с середины 1940-х годов ядерные державы произвели

Bruce D. Larkin [ed]: Selected Texts and Statements [2006-2011]

более двух тысяч испытаний (фото: AFP)

2010 год ознаменовался важными событиями в сфере ядерного разоружения и нераспространения, что благоприятно сказалось на укреплении международной безопасности

Евгений Примаков, Председатель правительства РФ (1998-1999 гг.), Министр иностранных дел (1996-1998 гг.), Академик, член Президиума РАН

Игорь Иванов, Министр иностранных дел РФ (1998-2004 гг.), Секретарь Совета безопасности (2004-2007 гг.), Д.и.н., профессор МГИМО

Евгений Велихов, Президент Российского научного центра "Курчатовский институт", Академик, член Президиума РАН

Михаил Моисеев, Начальник Генерального штаба, первый заместитель министра обороны СССР (1988-1991 гг.), Генерал армии

2010 год ознаменовался важными событиями в сфере ядерного разоружения и нераспространения, что благоприятно сказалось на укреплении международной безопасности.

Президенты России и США подписали в Праге новый Договор по СНВ. В случае его ратификации стратегические отношения между двумя ядерными державами станут более устойчивыми, транспарентными и предсказуемыми.

Многосторонний саммит по ядерной безопасности, состоявшийся в Вашингтоне, принял решения по улучшению сохранности ядерных материалов в мире.

Очередная обзорная Конференция по Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО) завершилась успешным принятием итогового документа о путях упрочнения договора, его режима и институтов.

Все это, несомненно, весьма полезные шаги. Однако они пока не затрагивают стратегическую ядерную идеологию - взаимное ядерное сдерживание. Между тем парадокс ядерного сдерживания состоит в том, что оно по большей части обращено к угрозам прошлого века, в то время как вероятность крупномасштабного вооруженного конфликта между великими державами и их союзниками в современных условиях глобализации и многополярности близка к нулю.

Вместе с тем ядерное сдерживание бессильно против новых угроз XXI века: распространения оружия массового уничтожения (ОМУ) и средств его доставки, международного терроризма, этнических и религиозных конфликтов, трансграничной преступности и пр. Хуже того, ядерное сдерживание в ряде случаев подстегивает процессы распространения ОМУ

Bruce D. Larkin [ed]: Selected Texts and Statements [2006-2011]

и ракетных технологий или мешает более глубокому сотрудничеству великих держав в борьбе с такими угрозами (совместное развитие систем ПРО).

Для того чтобы ядерное сдерживание не препятствовало взаимодействию ключевых игроков на мировой арене, нужно путем договоров понижать уровни вооружений на основе принципа минимальной достаточности, укреплять стратегическую стабильность в контексте обеспечения равной и неделимой безопасности для всех, исключить возможность первого ядерного удара или пуска ракет из-за технической неисправности и ошибочной оценки намерений другой стороны, или дефицита времени на принятие решения политического руководства. Новый Договор по СНВ отвечает этим целям, но многое в этой сфере еще предстоит сделать.

Следующий этап ядерного разоружения не может быть исключительно двусторонним. Потребуется ограничения и меры доверия применительно к третьим ядерным державам. В отличие от США геостратегическое положение России делает ее досягаемой для всех ядерных государств, что не может не учитываться при дальнейшем глубоком ядерном разоружении.

Концепция ядерного сдерживания стала непреодолимым препятствием на долгом и нелегком пути всеобщего ядерного разоружения. Не секрет, что в США, России и других странах имеются не только сторонники, но и противники процесса ядерного разоружения. Кто-то просто не может избавиться от идеологических стереотипов "холодной войны". Но немало и тех, кто высказывает вполне конкретные и не лишённые оснований опасения в связи с этим процессом. От таких доводов нельзя просто отмахнуться - их следует самым серьезным образом учитывать, чтобы последовательно снимать реально существующие препятствия на пути дальнейших глубоких ядерных сокращений.

В России, например, по-прежнему широко распространено мнение, что ядерный потенциал страны является главным атрибутом российского статуса великой державы, без которого США и другие страны не будут считаться с ее внешнеполитическими интересами.

Мы убеждены, что статус России в окружающем мире будет обеспечиваться, главным образом, модернизацией экономики, ростом жизненного уровня, социально-политическими правами и свободами граждан, развитием науки и культуры. Но пока в международных отношениях используется угроза "проецирования силы" и ее прямое применение, Россия будет вынуждена сохранять достаточный военный, в том числе ядерный, потенциал - для защиты себя и своих союзников, отстаивания своих законных интересов.

Таким образом, путь к ядерному разоружению лежит через рост доверия между государствами и укрепление международной безопасности и стабильности. Администрация Барака Обамы провозгласила курс на многосторонность действий в обеспечении международной безопасности,

Bruce D. Larkin [ed]: Selected Texts and Statements [2006-2011]

укрепление ее правовых норм и действующих институтов, приоритетность дипломатии в решении спорных проблем, равноправное партнерство с Россией. Важно, чтобы эти принципы были реализованы в практической внешней политике США и их союзников.

Это касается и ПРО, и обычных вооружений, и стратегических носителей в неядерном исполнении, и планов милитаризации космоса. На этих и других направлениях в сфере ограничения вооружений в ближайшее время потребуются дополнительные далеко идущие меры укрепления доверия.

Размышляя о долгосрочной перспективе, мы пришли к мнению, что мир без ядерного оружия - это отнюдь не нынешний мир минус ядерное оружие. Нужна международная система, построенная во многом на иных принципах и институтах. Мир, свободный от ядерного оружия, не должен стать миром, свободным для войн с применением других видов ОМУ, обычных вооруженных сил, новейших неядерных вооружений и систем на новых физических принципах.

При этом речь идет не только о больших войнах, но и о локальных конфликтах. Ведь малые страны сейчас смотрят на ядерное оружие как на средство нейтрализации огромного превосходства ведущих держав по обычным вооружениям. Именно в этом заключается один из стимулов ядерного распространения на региональном уровне, порождающий угрозу ядерного терроризма. Устранение таких опасностей требует создания надежных механизмов мирного решения как больших, так и локальных международных и трансграничных конфликтов.

Поэтому реализация идеи ядерного разоружения, которая должна оставаться стратегической целью, возможна лишь в контексте глубокой реорганизации всей международной системы.

Это, безусловно, поможет решению и других ключевых проблем XXI века, связанных с глобальной экономикой и финансами, энергообеспечением, экологией, климатом, демографией, эпидемиями, трансграничной преступностью, религиозным и этническим экстремизмом.

В таком контексте ядерное разоружение не столько самоцель, сколько одно из важнейших направлений, предпосылка и способ реорганизации международной жизни на более цивилизованной основе в прямом смысле этого понятия и в соответствии с велением наступившего столетия.

Editor's Note

Analysts and governments use 'ultimate' and 'eventual', 'steps', 'goals' and 'aims', and circumlocutions such as 'first create an international environment that better supports disarmament' to avoid committing to any given date. They may be simply cautious, or may be masquing a policy of 'never now, only later'. After all, advocates of abolition 'sooner rather than later' also speak of goals and aims. One reason to return to original texts is to parse carefully whether what is proposed, while it may also address immediate concerns, is a practical step toward abolition.

Once the governments with nuclear weapons commit to 'prompt, prudent, and pragmatic denuclearization' the world could

achieve 'pragmatic zero' within ten years. It is in the interest of nuclear weapon holders, and will remain in their interest, to do so.

Governments convinced of the merit of denuclearization will be faced, in some countries, with vigorous domestic opposition, which will paint a contrary case, insist abolition is simple-minded, and may even charge *treason*. In consequence, in large measure, abolition will be decided in the domestic political arenas of each of the nuclear weapon states. But choices made in other states—nuclear and non-nuclear—will crucially complicate or advance the case for abolition.

Abbreviations

CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START I]
UK	United Kingdom
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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2010.02.02	Addition of op-eds by former and current figures in France, Italy, and Germany. A list of such statements included in the Index to selected entries. Other concise additions.
2010.02.21	Addition of Belgian ex-officials' op-ed; and URL and excerpt of ICNND Report. Minor corrections.
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