COLLABORATIVE.NOTES.ARCHIVE

“PARIS — The European Union is trying to revive a movement to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, proposing a global ban on nuclear testing and a moratorium on the production of all fissile material, according to a letter from the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, made public on Monday.

“France, a nuclear power, holds the European Union presidency until the end of the year, so Mr. Sarkozy wrote to the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, in the name of the union. ‘We are convinced of the necessity to work for general disarmament,’ Mr. Sarkozy wrote in the two-page letter, dated Dec. 5 and released by his office. ‘The United Nations has an important role to play in the debate on disarmament. Europe wants to play an important role.’ The number of nuclear weapons worldwide is at least 20,000, and there is a new interest in reviving efforts to sharply reduce the number in a post-cold-war world where smaller, less stable countries are thought to be pursuing nuclear weapons, and where nuclear terrorism is a concern. President-elect Barack Obama promised in his campaign to make ‘the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in our nuclear policy.’

“The growing debate over the Iranian nuclear program is an important backdrop to the European effort, French officials said. Iran has refused to stop uranium enrichment despite United Nations sanctions. It says its enrichment program is only for peaceful nuclear power; no Western government believes that, and intelligence agencies expect Iran to have enough enriched material for a nuclear weapon by the end of 2009. Some nuclear experts say they believe that Iran has enough enriched uranium for one bomb.

“The European Union is also proposing ‘the opening of consultations on a treaty forbidding short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles,’ which is highly unlikely because of their increasing use in conventional warfare.

“Other proposals include the universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the dismantling of nuclear bomb test sites, and a universal inspection regime, and the Europeans urge further progress in talks between the United States and Russia on a follow-on treaty to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or Start.

“The publication of Mr. Sarkozy’s letter seemed timed to coincide with a conference beginning on Tuesday in Paris of an international group pressing for the elimination of nuclear arms.

“The group, called Global Zero, includes Thomas R. Pickering, a former American ambassador to the United Nations, Russia, Israel, India, El Salvador, Jordan and Nigeria; Richard Burt, a former American ambassador to Germany and former nuclear-arms negotiator; Margaret Beckett, a British Labor legislator and former foreign secretary; Sir Malcolm Rifkind, a British Conservative legislator and former foreign secretary; and Queen Noor of Jordan, the widow of King Hussein. Former President Jimmy Carter and the former Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev are listed as supporters.”

A version of this article appeared in print on December 9, 2008, on page A17 of the New York edition.

Today we introduce, as an appendix to the Journal, a catalog of measures which have been proposed, or could be proposed, to move toward ZNW (Zero Nuclear Weapons). This appendix will be augmented and revised, from time to time. In this first form it includes some ‘stubs’ or placeholders, to which further entries can be attached. Please address your suggestions to editor@gcdd.net.

A few weeks ago we introduced, as an appendix to the Journal, a catalog of measures which have been proposed, or could be proposed, to move toward ZNW (Zero Nuclear Weapons). This appendix will be augmented and revised, from time to time. In this first form it includes some ‘stubs’ or placeholders, to which further entries can be attached. Please address your suggestions to editor@gcdd.net.

Today I’ve posted a brief article titled “What Would Nuclear Abolition Look Like?” The title is the subject of an ISODARCO conference I’ll be attending in Andalo, Italy 11-18 January. You can learn more about the conference at www.isodarco.it. After the Andalo conference I’ll go on to Ireland for a few weeks before returning to Massachusetts.

President Barack Obama has set a goal of a “world without nuclear weapons” but the Pentagon is leaning in a seemingly contradictory direction: a modernized nuclear arsenal.

The new administration has signaled its intent to swiftly engage Russia in negotiations on deeper cuts in their respective arsenals, with the ultimate aim of reducing them to zero.

But US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been leading another kind of charge, arguing in the final months of the previous administration that deeper cuts must be underpinned by production of a new warhead to replace an ageing nuclear stockpile.

“To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program,” he said in an October 28 speech.

Gates’s speech at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, says Jan Kristensen, an analyst at the Federation of American Scientists, was “an attempt to set a bottom line.”

“You can cut the numbers, but below that we need to have a strong capability, not only to maintain what we have, but also to build up if we need to.”

General Kevin Chilton, head of the US Strategic Command, warns that the United States is “living today off the largesse of an industrial base and a concept that was developed to support the Cold War which is many years in the rear view mirror right now.”

A Pentagon advisory panel led by former defense secretary James Schlesinger warned this month of a weakening US deterrent.

On the other hand, former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former defense secretary William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn say that nuclear weapons are increasingly ineffective as a deterrent.

They called for a “world free of nuclear weapons” in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece two years ago.

The debate is likely to intensify over the next year as the new administration reviews the US nuclear posture.

A bipartisan commission appointed by Congress is expected to weigh in April, and the Pentagon will undertake its own review later this year.

The White House has already staked out its position, declaring on its website that “Obama and (Vice President Joe) Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it.” They will stop production of new nuclear weapons, seek agreement with Russia to take missiles off hair trigger alert, and seek “dramatic reductions” in their respective arsenals, it said. But, it also said, “Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.”

Proponents of modernization argue that as weapons in the existing stockpile age, doubts about their safety and reliability will inevitably grow, thereby lessening their deterrent value. They want Congress to fund the production of a new so-called "Reliable Replacement Warhead," which would incorporate safety features in its design to prevent accidental detonation or unauthorized use.

The Congress, however, has been skeptical of the need for the RRW. Studies have shown no decline in the safety or reliability of the existing arsenal, and programs currently exist to extend their shelf life

Moreover, critics fear that the program will open the door to production of new types of nuclear weapons for military uses

Those suspicions were fueled by a series of Bush administration proposals that suggested it was looking for ways to use nuclear weapons in a host of new scenarios

The proposals included mini nukes, precision low yield nuclear weapons, a "robust nuclear earth penetrator" for deeply buried targets, and concepts for using nuclear weapons to destroy chemical or biological weapons

So when the administration turned around and proposed the RRW to replace the weapons in the existing arsenal, Congress balked

“There's lots of things that can be done to make real improvements to the existing stockpile, that should satisfy the concerns of those people who are genuinely concerned about safety and reliability,” said Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, a non-profit that supports nuclear disarmament initiatives.

“Only those who are using this as an excuse to expand the nuclear arsenal won't be pleased,” he said.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said Gates has not had a chance yet to discuss his ideas on nuclear issues with Obama.

“I think the secretary believes that, fundamentally, we have not done a good job of selling the importance of the Reliable Replacement Warhead," he said. "But these are discussions that he is going to have to have with his new boss.”

Agence France Presse. 2 February 2009. “Obama, Pentagon pull in different directions on no nukes goal” http://www.business24-7.ae/articles/2009/2/pages/obama,pentagonpullindifferentdirectionsonnonukesgoal.aspx

In case you haven’t seen it already, note Ivo Daalder & Jan Lodal’s article in the November-December 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs, “The Logic of Zero.”

The Daalder-Lodal article makes compelling recommendations of steps the US should now take. They are persuaded by the ‘logic of zero’ and judge it important to bring others, globally, to their view. Because of its publication in Foreign Affairs the article has had wide circulation.

For the record, I should emphasise that noting or quoting an article in these COLLABORATIVE NOTES does not necessarily mean that I agree with its author or commend the author’s approach. In the case of the Daalder-Lodal piece, for example, I think they make a real contribution by focusing on the ‘logic of zero’ but have several reservations about their arguments. For example, if you’ve read Designing Denuclearization you know I consider an “airtight verification system” of fissile material out of reach, but also believe an abolition regime can (and must) tolerate some uncertainty and the risk that follows from it. But I certainly agree with Daalder and Lodal on the importance of designing and instituting a “comprehensive international nuclear-control regime.”

contains more mistakes and irregularities than I suspect. My query is whether you can cast any light on this subject, because it runs beyond my knowledge and understanding. If you’re not a physicist or nuclear engineer, do you have a buddy who is and might be intrigued by the possibility of helping the Times get it right? Here are the problems, as best I can make it out:

(1) The article: “the agency had previously reported the old production as 630 kilograms.” But 630 kg of UF₆, uranium hexafluoride, not uranium. (Note 2)

Why does this matter? Because you can’t make an atomic bomb without first converting UF₆ to a smaller quantity of uranium. How much smaller? About a third smaller. And so that affects how we can understand Iran’s having, as claimed, “ 1010 kg, “more than a ton”, of “low-enriched uranium.” (Note 1) Again, is that 1010kg of uranium? Almost certainly not. The Director General‘s several previous reports all report the “product” as UF₆.

(2) There is no mention in the Times article what level of enrichment the claimed 1010 kg has reached, except to say it is “low-enriched uranium.” (We presume it is UF₆).

Why does this matter? Because the whole point of enrichment is to move isotopic ²³⁵U preferentially from its original proportion in the UF₆ feedstock to a higher proportion, in successive steps, each of which uses the partially-enriched output of the previous step as its feedstock. So if one began with UF₆ derived from natural uranium with a nominal proportion of 99.3% ²³⁸U and 0.7% ²³⁵U, the object would be to gradually increase from 0.7% to some higher number. Iran has said it will not enrich beyond 5%. A reported objective of a nuclear bomb program is to have sufficient uranium enriched to 90%, or a bit higher, ²³⁵U.

Successive Director General’s reports have told of different levels of enrichment. The 21 December 2007 report put it at 3.8%. The 6 May 2008 report said that Iran had declared “up to” 4.7%, and that samples taken by the IAEA inspectors had shown low-enriched uranium with “up to 4.0% U-235.” More recent reports have just used the phrase “as declared.” If the enrichment were actually to 4%, and not 5%, the quantity of ²³⁵U moved to the “product” side of enrichment would be that much less. Iran has not only some quantity of “product” at some maximum enrichment, but other UF₆ in the process of enrichment, and perhaps even some withdrawn from that process for whatever reason prior to reaching maximum enrichment. That is: there may be different quantities at different levels of enrichment. The point is: the article ignored degree of enrichment altogether.

(3) Consider this paragraph of the Times report:

“ ‘You have enough atoms’ to make a nuclear bomb, a senior United Nations official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the topic’s diplomatic sensitivity, told reporters on Thursday. His remarks confirmed estimates that private nuclear analysts made late last year. But the official noted that the material would have to undergo further enrichment if it was to be used as fuel for a bomb and that atomic inspectors had found no signs that Iran was making such preparations.

But there were ‘enough atoms’ present before enrichment began!

Another question for a nuclear engineer. Is it not the case that, in the process of centrifuge enrichment, a significant portion of the ²³⁵U is abandoned, because efficiencies favor using as feedstock the UF₆ which has a greater proportion of ²³⁵U? I’ve read that typically the unused portion is about 0.3% ²³⁵U. One IAEA report states that samples taken by inspectors showed LEU up to 4%, natural uranium, and depleted uranium (down to 0.4% ²³⁵U. (Note 3) What effect might this have on the speculation about having enough HEU to make a bomb?

(5) It is not clear that William J. Broad or David E. Sanger saw the report. Possibly not. IAEA supplies copies of the report to governments whose representatives sit on its Board. In principle, the report is only made public when it has been “derestricted” (what a strange term!) by the Board itself, which will meet in March. There was a press conference at which some unnamed IAEA official “briefed” reporters.

Perhaps the Director General’s report will make this all clear. The focus in the Broad-Sanger despatch was on 209 kg of “uranium”—presumably UF₆—which had been discovered and should have been included in Iran’s holding on 7 November 2008, and then the implications of the revised number should Iran elect to build a nuclear device. My concern is that the reportage does not seem to be well-informed.
I’ve been urged to look at chapter 5 of David W. Hafemeister’s Physics of Societal Issues, which probably explains a lot. Does any one of you have access to this book?
• (Note 1) William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than Thought”, The New York Times, ‘published’ 2009.02.19, but perhaps actually in paper of 2009.02.20.

• (Note 2) IAEA GOV/2008/59, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Report by the Director General.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-59.pdf (This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 27 November 2008)

• (Note 3) IAEA GOV/2008/15, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Report by the Director General.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf (This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 5 June 2008)