INDEX TO COLLABORATIVE NOTES

Documents and Articles in Red

GC.DD HOME PAGE

Serial 1. 2008.09.18. Collaborative Notes.
Serial 2. 2008.09.18. Chinese Position Paper.
Serial 3. 2008.09.20. Perkovich & Acton.
Serial 4. 2008.09.20. Archive Initiated.
Serial 5. 2008.09.29. Reckless Media.
Serial 6. 2008.09.29. McCain & Obama on Nuclear Weapons.
Serial 7. 2008.09.30. NTI creates World Institute for Nuclear Security.
Serial 8. 2008.10.01. 2009 Nonproliferation Challenge Essay Contest
Serial 9. 2008.10.08. US DOCUMENT: “NATIONAL SECURITY ... ”
Serial 10. 2008.10.14. Nuclear Forensics.
Serial 11. 2008.10.17. International Commission ...
Serial 12. 2008.10.17. ACA Job Announcement
Serial 13. 2008.10.21. George Perkovich on Nuclear Disarmament
Serial 14. 2008.10.21. Sharon Weinberger: “Scary Things That Don’t Exist”
Serial 15. 2008.10.23. Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal: “The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons”
Serial 16. 2008.10.24. International Panel on Fissile Materials. Reports.
Serial 17. 2008.11.17. Google Trends.
Serial 18. 2008.12.02. Nuclearist Codex ...
Serial 19. 2008.12.07. Risk Analyses ...
Serial 20. 2008.12.09. Global Zero Meets in Paris

Serial 21. 2008.12.10. Bruce D. Larkin: Catalog of Moves to Zero
Serial 22. 2008.12.31. Bruce D. Larkin: What Would Nuclear Abolition Look Like?
Serial 23. 2009.01.27. Report on XXII ISODARCO Winter Course. Nuclear Disarmament.
Serial 24. 2009.01.30. Stephen I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey. 2008 US nuclear security expenditure > $52 billion.
Serial 25. 2009.01.30. Note from the listmaster.
Serial 26. 2009.02.02. AFP on US Nuclear Policy. Abolition?
Serial 27. 2009.02.02. Oliver Thränert: Nuke-Free World; Ivo Daaldeer & Jan Lodal: Logic of Zero
Serial 28. 2009.02.05. UK Paper: . . . Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons
Serial 29. 2009.02.06. Henry A. Kissinger on Going to Zero
Serial 30. 2009.02.17. NOTE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ATLANTIC.
Serial 31. 2009.02.18. NOTE: MORE ON SERIAL 30
Serial 32. 2009.02.22. QUERY and re New York Times on Iranian nuclear program
Serial 33. 2009.02.24. MORE on CN 32.
Serial 34. 2009.03.17. Gordon Brown on UK NW Policy
Serial 35. 2009.03.24. New York Times Editorial on US NW Policy
Serial 36. 2009.04.01. Joint Statement on Medvedev-Obama Talks.
Serial 37. 2009.04.05. Obama Speech in Prague: US Nuclear Policy.
Serial 38. 2009.04.19. Draft JDD appendix on abolition proposals.
Serial 39. 2009.04.26. Abolition proposals: JDD Appendix B posted.
Serial 40. 2009.06.04. Additions to JDD Appendix B on abolition texts and statements.

Serial 41. 2009.06.15. Further additions to JDD Appendix B on abolition texts and statements.
Serial 42. 2009.07.19. Draft: “Have We Forgotten the Maginot Line?”
Serial 43. 2009.07.28. Bruce D. Larkin. “Have We Forgotten the Maginot Line?”
Serial 44. 2009.08.03. Arms Control Association. ‘New Voices Nonproliferation Fellowship’
Serial 45. 2009.08.13. Tracking citations, events & texts
Serial 46. 2009.09.12. MORE RE Tracking citations, events & texts
Serial 47. 2009.09.18. On Australian Parliament’s Joint Select Committee on Treaties Report #106
Serial 48. 2009.10.24. Bruce D. Larkin. “Nuclear Zero: Agreement, Irreversibility, and the Timetable Problem”
Serial 49. 2009.11.18. Bruce D. Larkin. REVISED “Nuclear Zero: Agreement, Irreversibility, and the Timetable Problem”
Serial 50. 2010.01.10. Bruce D. Larkin. REVISED [MORE] “Nuclear Zero: Agreement, Irreversibility, and the Timetable Problem”


Serial 51. 2010.02.16. Keynote [PowerPoint] presentations posted on GC.DD site. Links to former officials’s op-eds on ZNW.




COLLABORATIVE NOTES 1

Serial 1. 2008.09.18.

GC.DD Group:

We have made two major changes on the GC.DD website and changed the GC.DD Mailing List from an email alias to a phplist. These include greater content, cleaner graphics, and some user action. The publication of Designing Denuclearization is featured. Special thanks to Monica Mori, Alec Stefansky and Elyse Poppers, who offered comment & critique as the redesign was undertaken. [They are NOT responsible for the loading of text on the home page, which is strictly my responsibility.] You can see the result at

http://www.gcdd.net/

which takes you automatically to

http://www.gcdd.net/GC.DD=HOME.html

The redesigned home page features a Keynote presentation of main points on the design of denuclearization projects. This features some of the principal propositions advanced in Designing Denuclearization. To make it still easier to read those points, there is now also a page

http://www.gcdd.net/GC.DD=KEYNOTE.html

which shows the text (and some images) in a larger size. The Keynote file itself isn't accessible yet, as I'm tinkering, but I'm happy to provide interim versions: just ask.

NEW EMAIL DISTRIBUTION

This email represents the END of the email alias on which we've been relying for ever-so-long. In its place we'll use a readily recognizable version of a list-serve, with subscribe and unsubscribe features. If you've been longing to unsubscribe, here's an easy way. Another plus is that your email addresses won't be being circulated, to be picked up by scroungebots. We're just implementing this now, so please bear with our IT staff's hesitations and uncertainties as we see how best to use it.

GOING 'PUBLIC'

This is really ‘going public’. We hope to see the list expand. Anyone who comes to the GC.DD home page will be able to subscribe. What can we contribute to ongoing discussion that isn’t being done, or done as well, or done in keeping with the notion of ‘projects on denuclearization design,’ that the well-funded and staffed centers aren’t doing? What’s our niche leverage? We have to be more attentive to content. I will be approaching some of you to propose contributions you could make. If you’ve got an idea, by all means come forward.

SUGGESTIONS

Send us any suggestions, including criticism of the crowded home page if you agree with others—or disagree—that it’s unwieldy.

I’ll add a place for public sign-on to the GC.DD List when I’m satisfied we’ve got it up & running smoothly.

Cheers!

Bruce


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 2
Serial 2.    2008.09.18

RESOURCES
http://www.gcdd.net/GC.DD=RESOURCES.html

2008.09.16    Tuesday

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China at The 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” One section summarizes Chinese arms control and disarmament policies, acknowledging multilateralism but reiterating China’s long-standing emphasis on countries’ autonomy. The text states in part:

“China has consistently placed importance on and supported international arms control and disarmament efforts and stood for comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

“China is firmly opposed to the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery. To achieve the goal of non-proliferation, countries should be committed to building a global security environment of cooperation and mutual trust to realize universal security for all countries; try to resolve the proliferation issue by political and diplomatic means; bring into full play the core role of the UN and other relevant international organizations; and well handle the relations between non-proliferation and peaceful use.

“China has never evaded its due responsibilities and obligations in nuclear disarmament and supports the conclusion of international legal instruments on complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China has persistantly [sic] exercised the utmost restraint on the scale and development of its nuclear weapons and upheld its commitment that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and that it will unconditionally refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

“ China firmly supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and is actively promoting its early entry into force. China supports the Conference on Disarmament in concluding a comprehensive and balanced programme of work and launching negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as soon as possible.

“ China maintains that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under the current circumstances, the authority and universality of the NPT should be further upheld and strengthened for it to play an even greater role in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

“China supports the purposes and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. China has fully and strictly fulfilled the obligations under the two Conventions, supported the enhancement of their universality, and called on countries that own or possess chemical weapons and countries that have abandoned chemical weapons in other countries to further intensify their work and speed up destruction of chemical weapons.

“China has consistently stood for peaceful use of outer space and opposed the weaponization and an arms race in outer space. The formulation of relevant international legal instruments through negotiation is the best way to achieve this goal. ... ”

•  People’s Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China at the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. [English] [pdf] 2008.09.16.

•  same: at Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Position Paper. [English] [html] 2008.09.16.

•  same: as a pdf document. 第63届联合国大会中国立场文件. [Chinese] [pdf] 2008.09.16.

•  same: at Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. 第63届联合国大会中国立场文件. [Chinese] [html] 2008.09.16. 对不起,您浏览的网页已经删除。 Sorry, the webpage you browsed has been deleted!


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 3
Serial 3.    2008.09.20

RESOURCES
http://www.gcdd.net/GC.DD=RESOURCES.html

George Perkovich and James M. Acton,Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper No. 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2008. Image
Your institution may subscribe to the full text on line. Look for ‘Adelphi Papers’ as a journal to which your library provides access.

Serial 3.    2008.09.20

COMMENT

Perkovich & Acton’s Abolishing Nuclear Weapons is an extended essay systematically addressing five aspects of any move to ZNW: political preconditions, verification, the civil nuclear industry, enforcement, and what they term “hedging and managing nuclear expertise.” They emphasize questions that require study and consideration, and their suggestions are packaged neatly in a final summary. Anyone in search of a project in denuclearization design will find that this work offers many possibilities. Moreover, the authors’ considered speculations on obstacles and opportunities on paths to ZNW are a helpful contribution to reasoning on this subject.

Those of you with an association with UC Santa Cruz might want to know that George Perkovich is a UCSC graduate. His brief blurb at the Carnegie Endowment reads:

“George Perkovich is vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His personal research has focused on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation, with a focus on South Asia and Iran, and on the problem of justice in the international political economy. He is the author of the award-winning book India’s Nuclear Bomb, which Foreign Affairs called ‘an extraordinary and perhaps definitive account of 50 years of Indian nuclear policymaking.’ He is coauthor of a major Carnegie report, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, a blueprint for rethinking the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.”


Serial 3.    2008.09.20

NOTE FROM THE LISTMASTER

I’m step-by-step learning the startup of this distribution of Collaborative Notes. I haven’t quite figured out the relationship between how the list is sent and how email programs display notes at your end. At the present time you may be receiving the note in two forms, as a ‘browsed’ formatted display and as either text or the underlying html from which the display is generated. I would not mind help getting this neater, cleaner, and more convenient for you.

In due course—that is, when I can get around to it—there will be an archive of some sort enabling you to browse previously distributed notes.


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 4

Serial 4.    2008.09.20

Serial 4 has been superceded (2008.09.29) by Serial 6.

ARCHIVE INITIATED

http://www.gcdd.net/COLLABORATIVE.NOTES.ARCHIVE.html


Collaborative Notes are now archived as an rtf file. For starters the file is a first-to-last list and the URLs are hot. Access is via the right column of the GC.DD home page, or by clicking on the links in this note: http://www.gcdd.net/GC.DD=HOME.html

Those of you who know me best may counsel that I should be writing a paper on paths to denuclearization rather than playing with our website. OK. Site is in much better shape than a week ago, and I’ll turn to writing the paper with the sense that our project has a better public face.


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 5

Serial 5. 2008.09.29

COMMENT: RECKLESS MEDIA

Recent news brings this headline from Associated Press

Chief inspector: Iran may be hiding secret nukes

:----snip----:

Some content and a new way to handle Collaborative Notes. Instead of trying to put formatted email in your hands, I’ll just send this plain text announcement, with a note like the following:

COMPLETE NOTE AND ARCHIVE

http://www.gcdd.net/phplist/COLLABORATIVE.NOTES.ARCHIVE.html

GC.DD HOME PAGE

http://www.gcdd.net/


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 5

Serial 5. 2008.09.23

COMMENT: RECKLESS MEDIA

http://www.gcdd.net/phplist/CollaborativeNotes5.html

Recent news brings this headline from Associated Press


Chief inspector: Iran may be hiding secret nukes

By GEORGE JAHN –


VIENNA, Austria (AP) — The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency warned Monday that Iran may be hiding secret nuclear activities, comments that appeared to reflect a high level of frustration with stonewalling of his investigators.


What’s wrong with this picture? The headline says “secret nukes” but the actual text of the article says “secret nuclear activities.” This is a familiar pair. In the aftermath of the US military’s discovering no nuclear weapons in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, the White House sought to smudge the findings by talking of “nuclear weapons programs” and “WMD programs” ... though none even of those were ever found.

We at GC.DD implored the Corrections editor of the New York Times to correct an article that referred to Iranian nuclear weapons ... although no credible claims then, or since then, have been made that Iran has built even one nuclear weapon. The article’s author was blameless; the actual text said nothing about Iran having built a nuclear weapon. The problem lay in the prominent subhead. The article was titled “ Cheney Says Israel Might ‘Act First’ on Iran” and surrounds a summary, which the Times calls a subhead, which says “A nudge to Tehran to agree to give up its nuclear weapons.” The Times accepted our point and in due course published a correction.

This is not to complain about speculation by a respected analyst, reported in today’s AP article, that Iran could—hypothetically—have enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon in six months or more, if conditions were met. That’s just reasoning on incomplete evidence, as we all must.

The question for denuclearization is how to conduct a sound public debate when distortion—and distortion that militates against denuclearization—is so easily introduced. The answer: insist on correction.


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 6

Serial 6. 2008.09.29

POINTERS —> McCAIN & OBAMA ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Stephen I. Schwartz, editor of the Nonproliferation Review, has posted an analysis of positions of Barack Obama and John McCain germane to nuclear weapons: “Barack Obama and John McCain on Nuclear Security Issues.”

The Nonproliferation Review is published by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Steve graduated from UC Santa Cruz in 1988.

The Arms Control Association has posted responses of Barack Obama to queries about nuclear policy. Other articles on the presidential race are at their webpage www.armscontrol.org/2008election.


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 7

Serial 7. 2008.09.30.

CHRONOLOGY 2006-2008
ChronFile.2006-2008.html

2008.09.29    Monday
The New York Times reported that the Nuclear Threat Initiative will create a World Institute for Nuclear Security, to be located in Vienna. “The institute intends to provide a forum where nuclear security professionals can meet and share information about how to keep dangerous materials out of unfriendly hands.”

•  William J. Broad, “New Security Organization Will Try to Prevent Nuclear Thefts,” The New York Times. 2008.09.29.



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 8

Serial 8. 2008.10.01.

2009 NONPROLIFERATION CHALLENGE ESSAY CONTEST

Nonproliferation Review editor Steve Schwartz suggests we note this announcement:

Doreen and Jim McElvany 2009 Nonproliferation Challenge Essay Contest

In order to spur new thinking and policy initiatives to address today's most urgent proliferation threats, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and its journal, the Nonproliferation Review, are sponsoring an essay contest to identify and publish the most outstanding new scholarly papers and reports in the nonproliferation field. Our priority is to generate new insights and specific recommendations for resolving today's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons challenges, including those involving both state and non-state actors.

The contest features a $10,000 grand prize and a $1,000 prize for the most outstanding student essay (students are eligible to win the grand prize).

Entries should not exceed 10,000 words (including endnotes) and must be the original, unpublished work of the author(s) and not under consideration for publication elsewhere.  The submission deadline is May 15, 2009.

Complete contest rules and instructions can be found at

http://cns.miis.edu/npr/contest.htm


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 9

Serial 9. 2008.10.08.

US DOCUMENT: “NATIONAL SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS ... ”

In February 2008 the US Departments of Defense and Energy issued a classified statement titled “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.” A “redacted and edited” version of the February paper was issued to the public in September 2008.

One section of the paper is headed “Does the United States Still Need Nuclear Weapons?” The paper argues that

“The United States has made great strides in developing and depoying both very advanced conventional weapon systems and missile defenses. However, nuclear weapons possess unique attributes and make unique contributions to national security. ... The United States will need to maintain a nuclear force, though smaller and less prominent than in the past, for the foreseeable future.”

This paper is, throughout, germane to the task of envisioning denuclearization. For the most part its relevance rests in the tension between claimed mission needs and capabilities available to the United States in an hypothesized non-nuclear world. In the following exeerpt ODSNW is ‘operationally deployed strategic nuclear wapons.’ Consider:

“ • The decades-old, highly integrated operational plan for strategic nuclear forces—the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP)—was replaced in 2003 with a plan that provides smaller, more flexible targeting options.
“ • Strategic nuclear warheads available on a day-to-day basis provide a spectrum of targeting options for consideration during rapidly developing, high-stakes contingencies. This force, much smaller than the 1,700 to 2,200 ODSNW, and routinely deployed and responsive to orders only from the President, serves immediate deterrence and defeat goals.”

In what “rapidly developing, high-stakes contingencies” does the US defense structure now consider nuclear weapons appropriate instruments? And in the fast-paced development of such circumstances, is the decision to use nuclear weapons now to be lodged in a single person, rather than—as long understood—in the two-person ‘national command authority’ of President and Secretary of Defense? And if one doubts both the ‘two-man rule’ and the notion of sole Presidential command, especiallly in exigent circumstances, who exactly would stand between US non-use of nuclear weapons and an authoritative decision commanding their use? And how much time would they have to decide?

•  Secretary Samuel W. Bodman (Energy) and Secretary Robert M. Gates (Defense). US Department of Energy and Department of Defense. “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.”. A “redacted and edited” version of a classified February 2008 paper.
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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 10

Serial 10. 2008.10.14.

NUCLEAR FORENSICS

The American Institute of Physics distributed the following on US nuclear forensics legislation. It is apparent that a denuclearization regime must have credible means to trace nuclear materials. See the discussion of NEST in Designing Denuclearization pp. 304 ff.

---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- Subject: FYI #100: Update on Nuclear Forensics Legislation From:    fyi@aip.org Date:    Mon, October 13, 2008 11:39 am --------------------------------------------------------------------------

FYI The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Science Policy News Number 100: October 13, 2008 Web version: http://www.aip.org/fyi/2008/100.html

Defense Bill Includes Nuclear Forensics Provision

"A believable attribution capability may help to discourage behavior that could lead to a nuclear event," concluded a report issued earlier this year by a Joint Working Group of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.  The report continued, "A forensics capability that can trace material to the originating reactor or enrichment facility could discourage state cooperation with terrorist elements and encourage better security for nuclear weapon usable materials."

About eight months after the release of this report, "Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, Program Needs," and Rep. Bill Foster's (D-IL) introduction of H.R. 5929, the Nuclear Terrorism Deterrence and Detection Act (see http://www.aip.org/fyi/2008/058.html), Congress  passed legislation requiring the development of a nuclear forensics R&D plan.  This bill, S. 3001, the FY 2009 defense authorization act, has been sent to the White House for the expected signature of President George Bush.

Section 3114, Enhancing Nuclear Forensics Capabilities, of the bill states the following under (a) Research and Development Plan for Nuclear Forensics and Attribution:

"(1) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.-The Secretary of Energy shall prepare and implement a research and development plan to improve nuclear forensics capabilities in the Department of Energy and at the national laboratories overseen by the Department of Energy. The plan shall focus on improving the technical capabilities required --

(A) to enable a robust and timely nuclear forensic response to a nuclear explosion or to the interdiction of nuclear material or a nuclear weapon anywhere in the world; and

(B) to develop an international database that can attribute nuclear material or a nuclear weapon to its source."

The legislation also calls for the submission of three reports.  The first is due within six months of the bill's enactment and requires the Secretary of Energy to provide a report on "the contents of the research and development plan" and "any legislative changes required to implement the plan."  The Secretary must submit a second report within eighteen months of the bill's enactment on "the status of implementing the plan."  Finally, within ninety days of enactment, "the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the involvement of senior-level executive branch leadership in nuclear terrorism preparedness exercises that include nuclear forensics analysis."

In addition to this bill language, there is a Joint Explanatory Statement from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO) that provides further insight:

"The House bill contained a provision (sec. 3113) that would establish a fellowship program for graduate students in nuclear chemistry and direct the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to prepare and carry out a research and development plan to improve the speed and accuracy of nuclear forensics radiation measurement equipment. In addition, the provision would direct the Secretary of Energy to prepare a research and development plan to support technical forensics and attribution capabilities, including an international database on nuclear material to allow prompt attribution of material or weapons.

"The provision would also amend the report on nuclear forensics capabilities required to be submitted by section 3129(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) to include a requirement to identify any treaty, legislative, or regulatory actions needed to establish the international database. The provision would also direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and Homeland Security, to submit a report with respect to a nuclear forensics advisory panel.

"The provision would also require a series of reports including, a report on the costs of the fellowship program; a research and development plan with the costs to implement the plan; a report on the research and development plan for technical capabilities to enhance forensics and attribution; and a report on the involvement of senior Executive Branch leadership in nuclear terrorism preparedness exercises.

"The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 3114) that would establish a nonproliferation scholarship and fellowship program.

"The [House and Senate] agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that would direct the Secretary of Energy to establish, prepare and implement a research and development plan to improve nuclear forensics capabilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) and at the DOE national laboratories. The Secretary of Energy should ensure that the House Committee on Science and Technology receives a copy of the report.

"In addition, the amendment would amend the report on nuclear forensics capabilities required to be submitted by section 3129(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) to include a requirement to identify any treaty, legislative, or regulatory actions needed to establish the international database.

"The amendment would also direct the President to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the involvement of senior level Executive Branch leadership in nuclear terrorism exercises including nuclear forensics analysis.

"Elsewhere in the agreement there is a separate provision that would establish a scholarship and fellowship program for nonproliferation and national security."

In a previous action, President Bush signed the FY 2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act providing flat funding for most departments and agencies through March 2009.  This bill also included twelve-month funding for the departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and military construction.  The  explanatory statement for the Department of Homeland Security portion of this bill, under Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) included the following:

"NATIONAL TECHNICAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS CENTER: The bill provides $16,900,000 for the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center. Within this total, $1,000,000 has been provided for the new fellowship program. This program is funded at an introductory scale and should grow based on performance and participation. As discussed in the Senate report, DNDO shall submit a report on the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, its quality assurance program, the results of the National Academy of Sciences study, and steps the Center is taking to implement these recommendations."

The Department of Homeland Security established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center in 2006, briefly describing this action as follows: "DNDO established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to collect and analyze material evidence in order to identify and ultimately prosecute those responsible for any potential act of nuclear terrorism."

###############
Richard M. Jones
Media and Government Relations Division
The American Institute of Physics
fyi@aip.org    http://www.aip.org/gov
(301) 209-3095
##END##########


•  The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Science Policy News Number 100: October 13, 2008 Web version: http://www.aip.org/fyi/2008/100.html
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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 11

Serial 11. 2008.10.17.

CHRONOLOGY

RECENT ENTRY

2008.09.26    Friday
Australia and Japan have launched the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, to be co-chaired by former Australian and Japanese foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi. Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso said in New York that

“As the only country that experienced the bombing of a nuclear weapon, Japan has always undertaken a realistic and concrete approach towards realising a nuclear weapons free world.”

Commissioners:

Gareth Evans (Australia) (Co-Chair)
Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan) (Co-Chair)
Ali Alatas (Indonesia)
Turki Al-Faisal (Saudi Arabia)
Alexei Arbatov (Russia)
Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway)
Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa)
François Heisbourg (France)
Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan)
Brajesh Mishra (India)
Klaus Naumann (Germany)
William Perry (United States)
Wang Yingfan (China)
Shirley Williams (United Kingdom)
Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico)

•  Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd,
“International Commission on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. Remarks. List of Commissioners, with identifications. 2008.09.26.
•  “Australia, Japan launch nuclear commission”. Agence France Presse. 2008.09.26.

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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 112

Serial 12. 2008.10.17.

ACA JOB ANNOUNCEMENT

JOB ANNOUNCEMENT

The Arms Control Association (Washington) circulated today the following job announcement:

Research Associate: Nuclear Weapons Policy and Nonproliferation

October 17, 2008

The Arms Control Association invites applications for a full-time, research associate dealing with nuclear weapons policy and nonproliferation issues. This position will entail research, analysis, writing, speaking, and policy advocacy on key aspects of the Association's agenda. He/she is responsible for assisting with the design and implementation of the Association's program. He/she reports to the executive director and/or other senior staff as assigned.

Applicants should be able to process complex information into easy to understand language; show commitment to goals of the Association; and be self-motivated. The Research Associate must have the ability to perform tasks in a timely manner; write clearly and concisely; pay attention to detail; organize issue files and information; and be resourceful in finding information necessary to get the job done. Applicants with an advanced degree and/or three or more years of relevant experience in the field are strongly preferred.

For a more detailed position description, click here http://www.armscontrol.org/employment#aca.

To Apply: The position will remain open until filled. Review of applications will begin on November 15, 2008. To apply, please send a cover letter, resume, 3 references, writing samples, and other supporting documents (including letters of recommendation) to: "Research Associate Position," ACA, 1313 L Street NW, Ste. 130, Washington, DC, 20005 or email to aca@armscontrol.org. No calls please.

###

The Arms Control Association was founded in 1971 and is a national non-partisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. ACA maintains a smoke-free workplace. ACA provides health benefits and a contribution to a retirement account for full-time employees. ACA is an equal opportunity employer.


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 13

Serial 13. 2008.10.21.

George Perkovich: “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons ... ”

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace announced today issuance of Policy Brief No. 66, authored by George Perkovich, CEIP Vice-President for Studies, and titled “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead.” Perkovich concludes that

“The elimination of all nuclear arsenals is not an end in itself. It is a means to global security. The verification and security conditions that would be required to enable the abolition of nuclear weapons are all conducive to a more secure world. Therefore, the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons can be a beneficial organizing principle of the national security policies of major states. The next U.S. administration should be one of its champions.”

•  George Perkovich, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Announcement. Full text (pdf). 2008.10.21.

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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 14

Serial 14. 2008.10.23.

POINTER

Sharon Weinberger: “Scary Things That Don’t Exist: Separating Myth From Reality in Future WMD”

A standard argument for retaining nuclear weapons is that they may be ‘needed’ to counter weapons which have not yet been conceived. Sharon Weinberger canvasses this argument, with a focus on ‘risk’ and ‘unknown unknowns.’

•  Sharon Weinberger,
“Scary Things That Don’t Exist: Separating Myth From Reality in Future WMD.” Stanley Foundation. Policy Analysis Brief. 2008.06.

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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 15

Serial 15. 2008.10.23.

POINTER

Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal: “The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons”

The Daalder-Lodal argument is simply that there is a logic that compels nuclear zero, that the United States must lead to that end, and that the route is to build the largest coalition of states accepting the ‘logic of zero.’ Their article will appear in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs. In their words:

“It will take a real commitment, at the highest levels and beginning with the United States, to turn the logic of zero into a practical reality. Many obstacles remain along this path, but it is important that Washington take the lead in setting out on that journey. The steps outlined here—limiting the purpose of nuclear weapons to preventing their use by others, reducing the U.S. nuclear stockpile to 1,000 total weapons, negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-control regime to account for and monitor all fissile material around the world, and pursuing a diplomatic strategy that seeks to build the largest possible coalition in favor of zero—will take time to implement. Each is useful in its own right, and they should be implemented as soon as is practical. Together, they will provide a good basis for success down the road. Many obstacles remain along this path. But not to start down it now, step by step, would mean accepting the increasingly grave risk that another nuclear weapon will one day be used.”

•  Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal:
“The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008, pp. 80-95.

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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 16

Serial 16. 2008.10.24.

POINTER

International Panel on Fissile Materials: http://www.fissilematerials.org/

The IPFM, established in 2006, has just issued the third in a series of annual reports. Each is a detailed narrative addressing topics concerning fissile materials. Panel membership is listed in each report. IPFM declares its purpose:

“The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear weapons disarmament, to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons.”

Subjects of the reports:

2006. background and introductory material, and “new initiatives to control fissile materials”

2007. “cleaning up after the Cold War” and “strengthening international controls”

2008. “scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty,” including discussion of challenges to verification. And a companion volume: “Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty.”

•  International Panel on Fissile Materials. Global Fissile Material: Report 2006. 2006.09.
•  International Panel on Fissile Materials. Global Fissile Material: Report 2007. 2007.10.
•  International Panel on Fissile Materials. Global Fissile Material: Report 2008. 2008.10.
•  International Panel on Fissile Materials. Global Fissile Material: Report 2008. Companion Volume.. Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. 2008.10.

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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 17

Serial 17. 2008.11.17.

POINTER

Google Trends: http://www.google.com/trends/

If you’re interested in changes in Net searches over time, you may have tried Google Lab’s new feature: Google Trends.

Here’s an example using the two simplest terms for the search: nuclear,weapon. Newspaper articles mark significant changes.

This seems to show that, except for the North Korean nuclear test, there is decreasing search interest in nuclear weapons. When I look at the “learn more” page, I’m actually not sure what the trend line shows. But Google tells us plainly: “how many searches have been done for the terms you enter, relative to the total number of searches done on Google over time. ” That’s plain enough. You might try searching just on the term ‘nuclear’, and note that you get the association with newspaper topics only if you forego using phrases in quotation marks.

Does this mean that concern about nuclear weapons is in decline?

Note that the links in the graphic (above) are not hot. To get hot links to the articles, please bring up Google Trends on your browser.


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 18

Serial 18. 2008.12.02.

JOURNAL OF DENUCLEARIZATION DESIGN

Contents: http://www.gcdd.net/TX=2008/TX.045=2008.12.02.JournalContents.pdf

Journal: http://www.gcdd.net/TX=2008/TX.046=2008.10.31.NuclearistCodex.pdf

Today we launch a cumulative, online digital journal, a vehicle for our studies and germane work by others: the Journal of Denuclearization Design.

To reach the journal, go to gcdd.net. In the right-hand column is a box for the journal, with links to Contents and Journal. I’ve been putting this together piece by piece, so right now the ‘journal’ link points to the first study. To get us started I’ve posted an exegesis of some recent documents on US nuclear policy and prospects: The Nuclearist Codex at the Onset of the Obama Era. The footnotes point to several significant documents of the last two years.

Please take a moment to look at the Journal and reflect on whether you might have a suitable paper to submit. In addition to ‘academic’ papers we will welcome for consideration book reviews, policy proposals, and other contributions. (We can also share briefer items in these Collaborative Notes.)


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 19

Serial 19. 2008.12.07.

MARTIN HELLMAN on Risk Analyses of Nuclear Deterrence

Martin Hellman is Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University. He is known, with Whitfield Diffie and Ralph Merkle, for his role in inventing public key cryptography (see Wikipedia: Diffie-Hellman key exchange). He is also a long-standing student of nuclear war.

His note below points to his recent work proposing risk analyses of nuclear deterrence. Such an analysis could begin, for example, by identifying (declaring, defining) a typical episode in deterrent relations. Then one would attempt reasoned speculation on the likelihood that such an episode would run to nuclear war. Finally one would ask: what does experience suggest about the frequency of such episodes?

Dear Prof. Larkin:

I came across your work on nuclear weapons and wanted to let you know of my related efforts. A one-page summary statement is at

http://nuclearrisk.org/statement.php

and if you would like to see more, you can download my paper "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" from the magazine cover icon in the left hand margin. I also have a new article for a more general audience "Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons," which is accessible from the glider picture icon in the left hand margin.

Thanks very much for your efforts. If enough of us keep talking about this critical issue, maybe society will eventually pay it some attention.

Martin
--
Martin Hellman
Member, National Academy of Engineering
Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University
http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 20

Serial 20. 2008.12.09.

GLOBAL ZERO

Note the conference of Global Zero, beginning today [Tuesday, 9 December 2008] in Paris. The following is from The New York Times.

Europeans Seek to Revive Nuclear Ban

By STEVEN ERLANGER

Published: December 8, 2008

“PARIS — The European Union is trying to revive a movement to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, proposing a global ban on nuclear testing and a moratorium on the production of all fissile material, according to a letter from the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, made public on Monday.

“France, a nuclear power, holds the European Union presidency until the end of the year, so Mr. Sarkozy wrote to the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, in the name of the union. ‘We are convinced of the necessity to work for general disarmament,’ Mr. Sarkozy wrote in the two-page letter, dated Dec. 5 and released by his office. ‘The United Nations has an important role to play in the debate on disarmament. Europe wants to play an important role.’ The number of nuclear weapons worldwide is at least 20,000, and there is a new interest in reviving efforts to sharply reduce the number in a post-cold-war world where smaller, less stable countries are thought to be pursuing nuclear weapons, and where nuclear terrorism is a concern. President-elect Barack Obama promised in his campaign to make ‘the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in our nuclear policy.’

“The growing debate over the Iranian nuclear program is an important backdrop to the European effort, French officials said. Iran has refused to stop uranium enrichment despite United Nations sanctions. It says its enrichment program is only for peaceful nuclear power; no Western government believes that, and intelligence agencies expect Iran to have enough enriched material for a nuclear weapon by the end of 2009. Some nuclear experts say they believe that Iran has enough enriched uranium for one bomb.

“The European Union is also proposing ‘the opening of consultations on a treaty forbidding short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles,’ which is highly unlikely because of their increasing use in conventional warfare.

“Other proposals include the universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the dismantling of nuclear bomb test sites, and a universal inspection regime, and the Europeans urge further progress in talks between the United States and Russia on a follow-on treaty to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or Start.

“The publication of Mr. Sarkozy’s letter seemed timed to coincide with a conference beginning on Tuesday in Paris of an international group pressing for the elimination of nuclear arms.

“The group, called Global Zero, includes Thomas R. Pickering, a former American ambassador to the United Nations, Russia, Israel, India, El Salvador, Jordan and Nigeria; Richard Burt, a former American ambassador to Germany and former nuclear-arms negotiator; Margaret Beckett, a British Labor legislator and former foreign secretary; Sir Malcolm Rifkind, a British Conservative legislator and former foreign secretary; and Queen Noor of Jordan, the widow of King Hussein. Former President Jimmy Carter and the former Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev are listed as supporters.”

A version of this article appeared in print on December 9, 2008, on page A17 of the New York edition.


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 21

Serial 21. 2008.12.11.

JOURNAL: MOVES TO ZERO

We recently announced the online-only Journal of Denuclearization Design. You can reach it at any time from the GC.DD home page. Format is pdf. You can also go to the full Journal or specific articles by bringing up the

INDEX.

Today we introduce, as an appendix to the Journal, a catalog of measures which have been proposed, or could be proposed, to move toward ZNW (Zero Nuclear Weapons). This appendix will be augmented and revised, from time to time. In this first form it includes some ‘stubs’ or placeholders, to which further entries can be attached. Please address your suggestions to editor@gcdd.net.

The current index shows:

THIS INDEX
Index.
COMPLETE JOURNAL
.. Complete Journal.
CONTENTS
1-13 The Nuclearist Codex at the Onset of the Obama Era.
Bruce D. Larkin. 31 October 2008.
APPENDICES
A: 1-21 Appendix A: Catalog of Moves in a Transition to Nuclear Zero.
Bruce D. Larkin. 10 December 2008.

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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 22

Serial 22. 2008.12.31.

JOURNAL: WHAT WOULD NUCLEAR ABOLITION LOOK LIKE?

and a HAPPY NEW YEAR!

We recently announced the online-only Journal of Denuclearization Design. You can reach it at any time from the GC.DD home page, or directly at the JOURNAL. Format is pdf. You can also go to the full Journal or specific articles by bringing up the

INDEX.

A few weeks ago we introduced, as an appendix to the Journal, a catalog of measures which have been proposed, or could be proposed, to move toward ZNW (Zero Nuclear Weapons). This appendix will be augmented and revised, from time to time. In this first form it includes some ‘stubs’ or placeholders, to which further entries can be attached. Please address your suggestions to editor@gcdd.net.

Today I’ve posted a brief article titled “What Would Nuclear Abolition Look Like?” The title is the subject of an ISODARCO conference I’ll be attending in Andalo, Italy 11-18 January. You can learn more about the conference at www.isodarco.it. After the Andalo conference I’ll go on to Ireland for a few weeks before returning to Massachusetts.

The current Journal index shows:

THIS INDEX
Index.
COMPLETE JOURNAL
.. Complete Journal.
CONTENTS
I:1-13 The Nuclearist Codex at the Onset of the Obama Era.
Bruce D. Larkin. 31 October 2008.
II:1-14 What Would Nuclear Abolition Look Like?
Bruce D. Larkin. 31 December 2008.
APPENDICES
A: 1-21 Appendix A: Catalog of Moves in a Transition to Nuclear Zero.
Bruce D. Larkin. 10 December 2008.

The Journal of Denuclearization Design is a cumulative digital-only journal edited and issued by the Global Collaborative on Denuclearization Design.

Access to the Journal is at the GC.DD website: www.gcdd.net. Please direct correspondence and submissions to editor@gcdd.net.

Some rights reserved: this work, its contents pages, or any complete article or set of articles, may be distributed freely subject to the attribution, non-commercial, and no derivative works conditions of the Creative Commons license 3.0. ‘Attribution’ is met by including this page (and the corresponding final page of the article or articles reproduced).


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 23

Serial 23. 2009.01.27.

REPORT: XXII ISODARCO Winter Course at Andalo (Trento) 11 - 18 January, 2009
“Nuclear Futures: What Would Nuclear Disarmament Look Like?”

At the ISODARCO winter ‘course’ I joined some 80 others in an intensive week of conversations about ‘going to zero’—abolition of nuclear weapons. The list of lectures is posted at the ISODARCO web site. In due course, perhaps two or three weeks from now, there should also be corresponding papers and vues (that is, PowerPoint or Keynote files). The ISODARCO site and Andalo program are at

     http://www.isodarco.it/

     http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo09/andalo09-prog.html

As I mentioned in COLLABORATIVE NOTES 22, I’ve written a brief article titled “What Would Nuclear Abolition Look Like?” corresponding to the subject of the Andalo conference. It is available at

     http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/JOURNAL.pdf

It’s worth keeping in mind the possibility of attending an ISODARCO conference—and planning ahead. Not only are the lecturers well-qualified and accessible throughout the week, but in calling it a ‘school’ its Italian organizers had in mind especially to introduce the intersection of science, technology, and policy to postgraduates and some who have no academic affiliation. Quite a few of those at Andalo were graduate students, typically with some interest bearing on nuclear disarmament or related topics, such as parallel treaty regimes, regional conflict, peace studies, and negotiation. In other years ISODARCO has departed from its core interest in nuclear disarmament to focus a school on terrorism and European security. It co-sponsors a conference in China every other year. Admission is by application, as explained on the ISODARCO web site. Please get in touch with me if you have any questions about ISODARCO: webmaster@gcdd.net. Several people associated with GC.DD have attended one or more ISODARCO events in the past, including Alec Stefansky, Joelien Pretorius, and Allen Greb.

Some video interviews, and perhaps video of one or more lectures, were made and are being posted on the website www.fulm.org or via the YouTube channel fondazioneugolamalfa. A video of Alexei Arbatov’s lecture is promised soon. Arbatov is the former deputy head of the Defense Committee of the Russian Duma, and a leading Russian scholar of nuclear policy.

I had ample opportunity to show Designing Denuclearization, passing it from hand to hand, and gave a session introducing the book and its main arguments. In addition, I distributed a homemade brochure showing the GC.DD website, sample pages of Designing Denuclearization, and sample pages of the Journal of Denuclearization Design. (You can download the brochure, which consists of two landscape pages, from the gcdd.net home page.)

Bruce



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 24

Serial 24. 2009.01.30.

Stephen I. Schwartz with Deepti Choubey, “Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Alternatives”

Stephen I. Schwartz, editor of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies'Nonproliferation Review, spoke on the East Coast recently about his estimate of the current cost of US nuclear weapons. One presentation, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 12 January 2009, with CEIP’s Deepti Choubey, has been neatly packaged on the web by CEIP. The page includes links to a transcript, slides (vues), audio and video. Steve’s message is direct: even without access to secrets, it can be shown that more than $52 billion was spent by the US government on nuclear security, including the weapons, directly related programs, and their direct entailments in fiscal year 2008. See the CEIP page

     http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22602

Steve is a 1988 graduate of the University of California at Santa Cruz, and editor of the important survey of cumulative US nuclear weapons costs, Atomic Audit.

I strongly recommend taking a few minutes to look at the web page. Not only does the content merit wider circulation, but the presentation is a useful and effective model.

Bruce



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 25

Serial 25. 2009.01.30.

GC.DD: COLLABORATIVE NOTES, the CN ARCHIVE, and GC.DD CHRONOLOGIES

We’ve posted items in the CHRONOLOGIES concerning China’s just-released survey China’s National Defense and today’s New York Times editorial urging steps to mitigate nuclear weapons. To read the chronologies go to the gc.dd home page (just address gcdd.net in your browser) and choose the most recent—2007-2009—chronology in the upper-left of the page.

All COLLABORATIVE NOTES can be consulted by clicking on the Archive option at the bottom of this note. The Archive has an index list at the top. Or you can go to gcdd.net and locate the Archive link, under the heading COLLABORTIVE NOTES.

For your convenience, here’s a direct link to the current Chronology:

    http://www.gcdd.net/GC.DD=ChronFile.2007-2009.html

And Steve Schwartz reminds me he graduated from UCSC in 1987, not 1988.

Bruce



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 26

Serial 26. 2009.02.02.

U.S. POLICY: ABOLITION. WHITE HOUSE AND DEFENSE.

An Agence France Presse despatch summarizes, in simple terms, the likely fault line between US nuclear abolition advocates and nuclear weapon proponents centered in the Department of Defense. [Despatch below.] The question is: how—and how far—will the White House pursue the “goal of a world without nuclear weapons” as they have declared they will?

We posted a concise but well-documented account of this contest as an article in the Journal of Denuclearization Design on 31 October 2008: “The Nuclearist Codex at the Onset of the Obama Era.” You can read this by going to

    http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/JOURNAL.pdf

“Obama, Pentagon pull in different directions on no nukes goal”

By AFP  on Sunday, February 01, 2009

President Barack Obama has set a goal of a “world without nuclear weapons” but the Pentagon is leaning in a seemingly contradictory direction: a modernized nuclear arsenal.

The new administration has signaled its intent to swiftly engage Russia in negotiations on deeper cuts in their respective arsenals, with the ultimate aim of reducing them to zero.

But US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been leading another kind of charge, arguing in the final months of the previous administration that deeper cuts must be underpinned by production of a new warhead to replace an ageing nuclear stockpile.

“To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program,” he said in an October 28 speech.

Gates’s speech at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, says Jan Kristensen, an analyst at the Federation of American Scientists, was “an attempt to set a bottom line.”

In Kristensen’s view, the secretary’s message was:

“You can cut the numbers, but below that we need to have a strong capability, not only to maintain what we have, but also to build up if we need to.”

Kristensen added: “That is the big clash.”

Gates is not alone in his thinking.

General Kevin Chilton, head of the US Strategic Command, warns that the United States is “living today off the largesse of an industrial base and a concept that was developed to support the Cold War which is many years in the rear view mirror right now.”

A Pentagon advisory panel led by former defense secretary James Schlesinger warned this month of a weakening US deterrent.

On the other hand, former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former defense secretary William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn say that nuclear weapons are increasingly ineffective as a deterrent.

They called for a “world free of nuclear weapons” in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece two years ago.

The debate is likely to intensify over the next year as the new administration reviews the US nuclear posture.

A bipartisan commission appointed by Congress is expected to weigh in April, and the Pentagon will undertake its own review later this year.

The White House has already staked out its position, declaring on its website that “Obama and (Vice President Joe) Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it.” They will stop production of new nuclear weapons, seek agreement with Russia to take missiles off hair trigger alert, and seek “dramatic reductions” in their respective arsenals, it said. But, it also said, “Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.”

Proponents of modernization argue that as weapons in the existing stockpile age, doubts about their safety and reliability will inevitably grow, thereby lessening their deterrent value. They want Congress to fund the production of a new so-called "Reliable Replacement Warhead," which would incorporate safety features in its design to prevent accidental detonation or unauthorized use.

The Congress, however, has been skeptical of the need for the RRW. Studies have shown no decline in the safety or reliability of the existing arsenal, and programs currently exist to extend their shelf life

Moreover, critics fear that the program will open the door to production of new types of nuclear weapons for military uses

Those suspicions were fueled by a series of Bush administration proposals that suggested it was looking for ways to use nuclear weapons in a host of new scenarios

The proposals included mini nukes, precision low yield nuclear weapons, a "robust nuclear earth penetrator" for deeply buried targets, and concepts for using nuclear weapons to destroy chemical or biological weapons

So when the administration turned around and proposed the RRW to replace the weapons in the existing arsenal, Congress balked

“There's lots of things that can be done to make real improvements to the existing stockpile, that should satisfy the concerns of those people who are genuinely concerned about safety and reliability,” said Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, a non-profit that supports nuclear disarmament initiatives.

“Only those who are using this as an excuse to expand the nuclear arsenal won't be pleased,” he said.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said Gates has not had a  chance yet to discuss his ideas on nuclear issues with Obama.

“I think the secretary believes that, fundamentally, we have not done a good job of selling the importance of the Reliable Replacement Warhead," he said. "But these are discussions that he is going to have to have with his new boss.”

Agence France Presse. 2 February 2009. “Obama, Pentagon pull in different directions on no nukes goal” http://www.business24-7.ae/articles/2009/2/pages/obama,pentagonpullindifferentdirectionsonnonukesgoal.aspx



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 27

Serial 27. 2009.02.03.

OLIVER THRÄNERT: “WHY A NUKE-FREE WORLD IS POSSIBLE”
IVO DAALDER and JAN LODAL: “THE LOGIC OF ZERO”

Oliver Thränert, a senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), recently published in Der Spiegel an account emphasising obstacles in the way of denuclearization, but concluding that “we have no choice” but to achieve a total ban on nuclear weapons:

    “Why a Nuke-Free World is Possible”

In case you haven’t seen it already, note Ivo Daalder & Jan Lodal’s article in the November-December 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs, “The Logic of Zero.”

    “The Logic of Zero”

The Daalder-Lodal article makes compelling recommendations of steps the US should now take. They are persuaded by the ‘logic of zero’ and judge it important to bring others, globally, to their view. Because of its publication in Foreign Affairs the article has had wide circulation.

For the record, I should emphasise that noting or quoting an article in these COLLABORATIVE NOTES does not necessarily mean that I agree with its author or commend the author’s approach. In the case of the Daalder-Lodal piece, for example, I think they make a real contribution by focusing on the ‘logic of zero’ but have several reservations about their arguments. For example, if you’ve read Designing Denuclearization you know I consider an “airtight verification system” of fissile material out of reach, but also believe an abolition regime can (and must) tolerate some uncertainty and the risk that follows from it. But I certainly agree with Daalder and Lodal on the importance of designing and instituting a “comprehensive international nuclear-control regime.”

Bruce



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 28

Serial 28. 2009.02.05.

CHRONOLOGY: UK PAPER ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

This NOTE reproduces the chronology entry on the British paper issued yesterday. In the past few days GC.DD has posted several items to the current online chronological file at http://www.gcdd.net/GC.DD=ChronFile.2007-2009.html, and the most recent item as part of the GC.DD home page at http://www.gcdd.net/. And a reminder: all COLLABORTIVE NOTES can be consulted at the archive file http://www.gcdd.net/COLLABORATIVE. NOTES.ARCHIVE.html.

If you come across something which you think should be circulated via COLLABORATIVE NOTES please bring it to my attention: webmaster@gcdd.net.


UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband today issued a paper titled LIFTING THE NUCLEAR SHADOW: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons. A summary of the paper’s main points was also posted on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website.

The paper is simply worded, a summary of UK declaratory policy on nuclear disarmament. It continues the position outlined by then Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket speaking in Washington in June 2007. (See Becket remarks.) Abolition of nuclear weapons is treated as an objective, but an ‘ultimate’ goal, before which a number of daunting prerequisites must be met. The paper also paraphrases positions which illustrate the range of different views among specialists and public, enabling it to suggest complexity withut being required to resolve it. The paper’s helpfulness is in setting out three general conditions and a number of germane steps which could be taken in endeavoring to meet obstacles. The three conditions:

“There are three main sets of such conditions and six specific steps to help create them which are potentially attainable within the next few years.

+ “Condition 1: watertight means to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading to more states or to terrorists at the same time as nuclear energy is expanding;”
+ “Condition 2:  minimal arsenals and an international legal framework which puts tight, verified constraints on nuclear weapons.”
+ “Condition 3:  finding solutions to the challenges of moving from small numbers of nuclear weapons to zero in ways which enhance security.”

To see the associated steps, please go to the sources cited below. And “over the longer term” the UK calls for three more reaching conditions to be satisfied:

+  improved politial relations between key states;
+  ensuring that “limiting or banning” nuclear weapons doesn’t provoke compensatory arms racing in other weapons;
+  collective security arrangements, both to enforce ZNW and maintain international security.

(GC.DD editor’s comment:) The FCO giveth and taketh away. Yes, the aim is zero. But, the conditions pose severe obstacles. A nuclear weapon state could, if it judged it to be in its interest, hide behind the difficulties those obstacles represent. Still, they are and should be the concerns of governments and publics, so they must be addressed. It is useful to have them set out so straightforwardly. (End comment.)

And the paper concludes on a high note, in effect offering a challenge to design and negotiation:

We need to build a global coalition around not only a shared vision of a world free of nuclear weapons but also of how we are going to work together to make it happen. We need to make a clean break from current perceptions that in this field everything is a zero sum game and instead work to establish virtuous circles in which progress on non-proliferation, disarmament and political and security conditions reinforce each other, enabling breakthroughs in areas which for many years have seemed intractable. We must find common cause and move from a decade of deadlock to a decade of decisions. We face a long hard road. But the dream of those early pioneers who first tried to ban nuclear weapons can yet be made a reality.”

• United Kingdom. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. LIFTING THE NUCLEAR SHADOW: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons. 2009.02.04.

• United Kingdom. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Summary. 2009.02.04.



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 29

Serial 29. 2009.02.14.

CHRONOLOGY: KISSINGER ON GOING TO ZERO

This NOTE reproduces a chronology entry:

An op-ed by Henry Kissinger on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was published on 2009.02.06 in the International Herald Tribune. (A fuller version appeared the next day in Newsweek, with a 2009.02.16 hardcopy publication date.)

Kissinger is one of the four ‘former statesmen’ who published op-ed pieces in the Wall Street Journal, in January 2007 and January 2008, advocating steps to bring about nuclear abolition. To my knowledge the four did not publish a joint appeal in January 2009, so we may understand Kissinger’s op-ed as the third in a series. As there has been speculation that Kissinger was the least enthusiastic about abolition of the four, there has been curiosity about what his sole position might be.

In short, Kissinger supports “ultimately” going to zero, insists that the approach must be “step-by-step”, and applauds some modest immediate steps which are among those advocated by the four. He stresses dangers of proliferation, challenges to non-proliferation by Iran and North Korea, and the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as along as others have nuclear weapons. Still, he reports that “we reaffirm the objective of a world without nuclear weapons.” My reading of Kissinger’s op-ed is that he is less convinced than his three compadres of the need for prompt zero. But Reader can compare the texts and be his or her own judge.
GC.DD has prepared a side-by-side presentation of the two versions just published, with highlighting to show differences between the texts and some sentences judged especially salient.

• George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, The Wall Street Journal, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”. 2007.01.04.(See 2007.01.04)

• George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, The Wall Street Journal, “Toward A Nuclear Free World”. 2008.01.15. (See 2008.01.15)


• Henry A. Kissinger, “Containing the Fire of the Gods”, International Herald Tribune, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”. 2009.02.06.

• Henry A. Kissinger, “Our Nuclear Nightmare”. Newsweek. Online 2009.02.07. Issue of 2009.02.16.

• George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, The Wall Street Journal and Newsweek. The two versions of Kissinger’s op-ed side-by-side. 2009.02.06.





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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 30

Serial 30. 2009.02.17.

NOTE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ATLANTIC
A CHANCE COLLISION or GAME GONE AWRY?

Sometime in early February, probably the night of February 3rd-4th, a British and a French ballistic missile submarines did a fender-bender in—according to one source—deep water. Each of the boats carried 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles, presumed armed with nuclear weapons. This note includes citations to several blogs and newspaper articles, some in French, which discuss the incident. I have just two things to add: first, that I’m skeptical of the official claim that this was just a chance encounter in the vast ocean; and second, while there may or may not be any connection, a Russian flotilla was off Ireland on February 14th.

The Russian warships came to public attention because a European environmental agency saw oil pollution on satellite transmissions showing the ocean. The first reports were that two Russian warships were about 200 miles off the west coast of Ireland and had lost some fuel during refueling activity.

By the 17th the report was that there was a spill lying about 50 miles south of Fastnet, a rock with lighthouse near the southwestern tip of Ireland. The spill was estimated at 1000 tons of fuel oil. Then an Irish government minister, interviewed by Irish radio, said that the warships were actually “five or six, including an aircraft carrier.” If he was accurately informed, this was an unusual and unusually large sortie. It could well have included one or more attack submarines, not seen on the surface. Compare
Hans Kristensen’s discussion of Soviet submarine sorties in 2008. I haven’t seen any report stating when the Russian warships passed north of Scotland, so I don’t know if they were in the North Atlantic on the night of 3-4 February when they could have been attempting to locate the British and French submarines. And I don’t know if the Russians were nuclear-armed.


Of course it could be true that the British and French boats were operating in ignorance of each other. Some sources seem intent on calling the French deployment just another routine patrol. There’s another possibility: that they were engaged in a joint exercise, during which something went awry. Some of the sources are at pains to say that the two countries would not tell each other where there nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines were patrolling. It seems more parsimonius to hypothesize that as part of reduced patrols in the post-Cold War period the two countries do engage in operational collaboration. After all, in 1993 they institutionalized twice-a-year meetings, at the highest level, to discuss nuclear policy and doctrine.

• Guardian, Richard Norton-Taylor, “Nuclear submarine collision a ‘very serious incident,’” 2009.02.16.
• John F. Burns, “French and British Nuclear Submarines Collided in Atlantic,” The New York Times, 2009.02.16. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/europe/17submarine.html
• “Deux sous-marins avec 32 missiles nucléaires entrent en collision,#147; Mer et Marine, 2009.02.16. http://www.meretmarine.com/article.cfm?id=109563
• Le Monde [acknowledging AFP], “La marine confirme la collision entre deux sous-marins nucléaire début février,” 2009.02.16.
• Liberation, 2009.02.16. http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/defense/2009/02/collision-des-s.html
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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 31

Serial 31. 2009.02.18.

NOTE: MORE ON SERIAL 30
ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV REFUELED

The Russian warships off Ireland on 14 February 2009 included the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. According to a Russian statement (reported by a Reuters correspondent in Moscow on 18 February) the Admiral Kuznetsov was refueled but no significant spillage was observed.

Wikipedia describes the Admiral Kuznetsov, including this account:

“On December 5, 2008 the aircraft carrier and several other vessels left Severomorsk heading for the Atlantic on a tour which was announced would be lasting several months and which would include combat training including joint drills with Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and visits to several ports in the Mediterranean.[11][12] On this tour while the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier anchored off Turkey on January 7, 2009 a small fire broke out on the ship. One crewmember was killed by carbon monoxide poisoning. The fire was caused by a short-circuit.[13] According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies the Admiral Kuznetsov is routinely followed by two tugs in case of breakdown.[14]”

So it may be that these ships were on return to Russia from the Mediterranean.

The oil spill is now about 30 miles south of me. I keep my eyes open out the window in case the Admiral Kuznetsov appears on the horizon, but so far no luck.

• Wikipedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_aircraft_carrier_Admiral_Kuznetsov Seen 2009.02.18. For notes, see the Wikipedia entry.

• GlobalSecurity.org. “Project 1143.5 Kreml class Aircraft Carrier Cruiser” Seen 2009.02.18.



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 32

Serial 32. 2009.02.22.

QUERY & MORE ON MEDIA ROLE
NEW YORK TIMES AGAIN NOT QUITE RIGHT

It’s even possible that the article

William J. Broad and David E. Sanger,
“Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than Thought” (Note 1)


contains more mistakes and irregularities than I suspect. My query is whether you can cast any light on this subject, because it runs beyond my knowledge and understanding. If you’re not a physicist or nuclear engineer, do you have a buddy who is and might be intrigued by the possibility of helping the Times get it right? Here are the problems, as best I can make it out:

(1) The article: “the agency had previously reported the old production as 630 kilograms.” But 630 kg of UF6, uranium hexafluoride, not uranium. (Note 2)

Why does this matter? Because you can’t make an atomic bomb without first converting UF6 to a smaller quantity of uranium. How much smaller? About a third smaller. And so that affects how we can understand Iran’s having, as claimed, “ 1010 kg, “more than a ton”, of “low-enriched uranium.” (Note 1) Again, is that 1010kg of uranium? Almost certainly not. The Director General‘s several previous reports all report the “product” as UF6.

(2) There is no mention in the Times article what level of enrichment the claimed 1010 kg has reached, except to say it is “low-enriched uranium.” (We presume it is UF6).

Why does this matter? Because the whole point of enrichment is to move isotopic 235U preferentially from its original proportion in the UF6 feedstock to a higher proportion, in successive steps, each of which uses the partially-enriched output of the previous step as its feedstock. So if one began with UF6 derived from natural uranium with a nominal proportion of 99.3% 238U and 0.7% 235U, the object would be to gradually increase from 0.7% to some higher number. Iran has said it will not enrich beyond 5%. A reported objective of a nuclear bomb program is to have sufficient uranium enriched to 90%, or a bit higher, 235U.

Successive Director General’s reports have told of different levels of enrichment. The 21 December 2007 report put it at 3.8%. The 6 May 2008 report said that Iran had declared “up to” 4.7%, and that samples taken by the IAEA inspectors had shown low-enriched uranium with “up to 4.0% U-235.” More recent reports have just used the phrase “as declared.” If the enrichment were actually to 4%, and not 5%, the quantity of 235U moved to the “product” side of enrichment would be that much less. Iran has not only some quantity of “product” at some maximum enrichment, but other UF6 in the process of enrichment, and perhaps even some withdrawn from that process for whatever reason prior to reaching maximum enrichment. That is: there may be different quantities at different levels of enrichment. The point is: the article ignored degree of enrichment altogether.

(3) Consider this paragraph of the Times report:

“ ‘You have enough atoms’ to make a nuclear bomb, a senior United Nations official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the topic’s diplomatic sensitivity, told reporters on Thursday. His remarks confirmed estimates that private nuclear analysts made late last year. But the official noted that the material would have to undergo further enrichment if it was to be used as fuel for a bomb and that atomic inspectors had found no signs that Iran was making such preparations.

But there were ‘enough atoms’ present before enrichment began!

Another question for a nuclear engineer. Is it not the case that, in the process of centrifuge enrichment, a significant portion of the 235U is abandoned, because efficiencies favor using as feedstock the UF6 which has a greater proportion of 235U? I’ve read that typically the unused portion is about 0.3% 235U. One IAEA report states that samples taken by inspectors showed LEU up to 4%, natural uranium, and depleted uranium (down to 0.4% 235U. (Note 3) What effect might this have on the speculation about having enough HEU to make a bomb?

(5) It is not clear that William J. Broad or David E. Sanger saw the report. Possibly not. IAEA supplies copies of the report to governments whose representatives sit on its Board. In principle, the report is only made public when it has been “derestricted” (what a strange term!) by the Board itself, which will meet in March. There was a press conference at which some unnamed IAEA official “briefed” reporters.


Perhaps the Director General’s report will make this all clear. The focus in the Broad-Sanger despatch was on 209 kg of “uranium”—presumably UF6—which had been discovered and should have been included in Iran’s holding on 7 November 2008, and then the implications of the revised number should Iran elect to build a nuclear device. My concern is that the reportage does not seem to be well-informed.
I’ve been urged to look at chapter 5 of David W. Hafemeister’s Physics of Societal Issues, which probably explains a lot. Does any one of you have access to this book?
• (Note 1) William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than Thought”, The New York Times, ‘published’ 2009.02.19, but perhaps actually in paper of 2009.02.20.

• (Note 2) IAEA GOV/2008/59, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Report by the Director General.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-59.pdf (This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 27 November 2008)


• (Note 3) IAEA GOV/2008/15, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Report by the Director General.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf (This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 5 June 2008)




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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 33

Serial 33. 2009.02.24.

MORE ON THE NEW YORK TIMES REPORT
AND IRANIAN URANIUM ENRICHMENT

These sites address the New York Times report of Iranian uranium enrichment (see citation below for link).

Ivan Oelrich and Ivanka Barzashka,
“Iran’s Uranium: Don’t Panic Yet”. FAS Strategic Security Blog. 2009.02.23. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/02/irans-uranium-dont-panic-yet.php


James Acton, “Safeguards in Iran. And Elsewhere.” http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/

The Director General’s report to the IAEA Board of Governors is available at armscontrolwonk.com:

IAEA. Report of the Director General. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. GOV/2009/8. 19 February 2009. http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/158/Iran.pdf

If you are really interested in the technical practices, or just want to get a sense of the relevant details, check out (in order of increasing detail):

David W. Hafemeister’s Physics of Societal Issues: Calculations on National Security, Environment, and Energy (Springer, 2007). €114.95. You could also consult pp. 119 ff. via books.google.com.

Manfred Zendel, “IAEA Safeguards: Challenges in Detecting and Verifying Nuclear Materials and Activities. ” Tunable Diode Laser Spectroscopy Conference. Reims. 2007.
http://tdls.conncoll.edu/2007/zendelpaperreimsconferencefinal.pdf


European Safeguards Research and Development Association. Esparda Bulletin No. 31. International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials.
http://esarda2.jrc.it/bulletin/bulletin_31/08.pdf


• William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than Thought”, The New York Times, ‘published’ 2009.02.19, but perhaps actually in paper of 2009.02.20.



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 34

Serial 34. 2009.03.29.

CHRONOLOGY 2007-2009
ChronFile.2007-2009.html

2009.03.17    Tuesday
British PM Gordon Brown delivered a speech on nuclear policy promising to release “Road to 2010” proposals in the coming summer, a “credible roadmap towards disarmament by all the nuclear weapon states.” But Brown emphasises conditions to be met before reaching “the ultimate ambition of a world free from nuclear weapons.”

“So in the coming months Britain—working with other countries—will be setting out a ‘Road to 2010’ Plan with detailed proposals on civil nuclear power, disarmament and non-proliferation, on fissile material security and the role and development of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We will be seeking the widest possible international engagement and consultation around this plan.

“We will also host a recognised nuclear weapons state conference on nuclear disarmament issues and confidence building measures, including the verification of disarmament.”


• British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. “Speech on nuclear energy and proliferation”. Transcript (check against delivery). 2009.03.17.
http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page18631




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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 35

Serial 35. 2009.03.24.

CHRONOLOGY 2007-2009
ChronFile.2007-2009.html

2009.03.24    Tuesday
In a major editorial The New York Times cites President Barack Obama’s campaign pledges to resume arms control negotiations with Russia and seek deep cuts—in the Times words—“in pursuit of an eventual nuclear-free world.” The editorial calls for prompt talks on START I verification rules, due to expire before year’s end, and quick Senate confirmation of Rose Gottemoeller, the designated negotiator, and other measures.

• Editorial.
“Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms.” The New York Times. 2009.03.24.




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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 36

Serial 36. 2009.04.14.

CHRONOLOGY 2007-2009
ChronFile.2007-2009.html

2009.04.01    Wednesday
A “Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America” issued after their meeting on the sidelines of the G20 conference in London committed to nuclear abolition, but declared it a “long-term” goal.

We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations.”

A return to negotiated control was marked, however, by their agreeing to address the forthcoming end of the START I treaty:

“We agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty. We are instructing our negotiators to start talks immediately on this new treaty and to report on results achieved in working out the new agreement by July.”

•  “Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America”. 2009.04.01.



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 37

Serial 37. 2009.04.14.

CHRONOLOGY 2007-2009
ChronFile.2007-2009.html

2009.04.05    Sunday
US President Barack Obama declared his administration’s policy on nuclear proliferation and nuclear abolition in a speech delivered in Prague. Excerpts:

The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light. Cities like Prague that existed for centuries, that embodied the beauty and the talent of so much of humanity, would have ceased to exist.”

“Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.”

“ Now, understand, this matters to people everywhere. One nuclear weapon exploded in one city -– be it New York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague –- could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be -– for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival.”

“ Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked -– that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.”

“ Just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we must stand together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear in the 21st century. (Applause.) And as nuclear power –- as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.”

“ So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, ‘Yes, we can.’ (Applause.)”

“ Now, let me describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies –- including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.”

•  “Remarks of President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic”. 2009.04.05.




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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 38

Serial 38. 2009.04.19.

PLEASE COMMENT ON DRAFT Journal of Denuclearization Design APPENDIX
Draft

2009.04.19    Sunday

Group,

I’ve posted online, at a temporary address, the draft of a study guide to recent statements on nuclear abolition. It’s destined to be an appendix to our online journal Journal of Denuclearization Design. If you’ve got a moment, please click on the URL above marked ‘Draft’ and email to me any comments, suggestions, or additions you’d like to offer.

Cheers!

Bruce






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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 39

Serial 39. 2009.04.26.

Journal of Denuclearization Design Appendix B

2009.04.26    Sunday

Group,

Many thanks to those of you who offered advice/suggestions/extensions to the Appendix B draft. It is now online as “Distilling Denuclearization: Texts & Statements [2006-2010].” The result is available as Appendix B of the Journal of Denuclearization Design. You can find the Index or full Journal at


http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/Index.pdf

http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/JOURNAL.pdf

Of course, you can always go to the GC.DD home page and click on Index or JOURNAL.


As usual, please let me know if you have a suggestion of content or presentation for our site.

Cheers!

Bruce






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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 40

Serial 40. 2009.06.04.

Journal of Denuclearization Design Appendix B. Additional texts from France (2008.06), the United States (2009.04) and Norway (2009.06.03).

2009.06.04    Thursday

Group,

An augmented JDD Appendix B is now online as “Distilling Denuclearization: Texts & Statements [2006-2010].” This is Appendix B of the Journal of Denuclearization Design. You can find the Index or full Journal at


http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/Index.pdf

http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/JOURNAL.pdf

Of course, you can always go to the GC.DD home page and click on Index or JOURNAL.


The newly-added sections introduce:
[1] comment on nuclear disarmament in the June 2008 French Livre Blanc on security and defense;
[2] the report of a US Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy;
[3] the 3 June 2009 statement of four former Norwegian prime ministers and a former foreign minister, calling for nuclear weapons abolition. [Statement in full.]

Cheers!

Bruce






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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 41

Serial 41. 2009.06.15.

Journal of Denuclearization Design Appendix B. Additional texts from France (2008.06), the United States (2009.04) and Norway (2009.06.03) were noted in Serial 40. Now we’ve added texts from India (2009.05.29), Russia (2009.06.04) and Pakistan (2009.06.04).

2009.06.15.    Thursday

Group,

An augmented JDD Appendix B is now online as “Distilling Denuclearization: Texts & Statements [2006-2010].” This is Appendix B of the Journal of Denuclearization Design. You can find the Index or full Journal at


http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/Index.pdf

http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/JOURNAL.pdf

Of course, you can always go to the GC.DD home page and click on Index or JOURNAL.


The newly-added sections introduce a statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin and remarks by the Ambassadors of India and Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva).

Cheers!

Bruce






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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 42

Serial 42. 2009.07.19.

DRAFT: “Have We Forgotten the Maginot Line?”.

2009.07.19.    Sunday

Group,

I’ve drafted a note on the wisdom of spending large sums to detect nuclear sources at ports and borders. I’d be delighted to email a copy to you for comment. It’s formatted as a prospective article in the Journal of Denuclearization Design. The draft prompts questions, including these:

(1) is border inspection, as argued, a poor strategy against a determined ‘nuclear terrorist’?

(2) is there really a tradeoff between (i) spending for port & border inspection and (ii) spending to enhance intelligence and control-at-source?

(3) does it persuasively follow that abolition and FM control would better achieve security?

(4) if you judge there are contrary or complementary arguments that should be made, would you be willing to add these as comment to follow the end of the note? or

(5) does this note/article suggest a subject on which you would be willing to propose an article for the Journal of Denuclearization Design?

Please
let me know if you’d like me to email a copy of the draft to you.

Cheers!

Bruce






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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 43

Serial 43. 2009.07.28.

DRAFT: “Have We Forgotten the Maginot Line?”.

2009.07.28.    Tuesday

Group,

“Have We Forgotten the Maginot Line” is a brief article on the wisdom of spending large sums to detect nuclear sources at ports and borders. Thanks to those who responded to CN Serial 42 with comment on the draft. The text [pdf] is available at our site, http://www.gcdd.net, via the Index entry on Journal of Denuclearization Design, or directly at:

http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/J005=TX.063=2009.07.28.Maginot.pdf

The article prompts several questions, including these:

(1) is border inspection, as argued, a poor strategy against a determined ‘nuclear terrorist’?

(2) is there really a tradeoff between (i) spending for port & border inspection and (ii) spending to enhance intelligence and control-at-source?

(3) does it persuasively follow that abolition and FM control would better achieve security?

(4) if you judge there are contrary or complementary arguments that should be made, would you be willing to add these as comment to follow the end of the note? or

(5) does this note/article suggest a subject on which you would be willing to propose an article for the Journal of Denuclearization Design?

Cheers!

Bruce






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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 44

Serial 44. 2009.08.03.

Arms Control Association ‘New Voice’ Fellowship

2009.08.03.    Monday

Group,

The Arms Control Association [Washington, DC] is circulating a request for applications for the ‘New Voices Nonprolifration Fellowship’. Full information is available at

http://www.armscontrol.org/employment/newvoices

Their announcement includes the following:

The New Voices Nonproliferation Fellowship Program invites recent college undergraduate and graduate students to apply for a one year full-time fellowship with the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC.

Over the next one to two years, U.S. policy makers will make a number of pivotal decisions concerning nuclear weapons policy and the U.S. approach to arms control and nonproliferation that will have a deep and lasting impact on the international security environment for years to come. ACA believes that this is the time to work harder and more effectively than ever and sees many ways young people could quickly play a meaningful role. We have also found, however, that resources are stretched thin within our community, making it increasingly difficult for recent graduates to find compensated opportunities, thereby limiting the field, especially for those who have a demonstrated academic interest but simply cannot afford to work below a livable wage.

With the generous support of the Prospect Hill Foundation, the Arms Control Association is launching the New Voices Nonproliferation Fellowship in fall 2009. We anticipate making the fellowship a permanent recurring position, with a new selection process in 2010, 2011, and so forth, depending on future funding.

Issue Areas

The Arms Control Association works on a wide array of global security and nonproliferation issues, including:

• Biological Weapons
• Chemical Weapons
• Conventional Arms Control
• Counterproliferation
• Export Controls
• Missile Defense and Missile Proliferation
• Nuclear Nonproliferation
• Nuclear Weapons Policy
• Space Arms Control
• Strategic Nuclear Reductions
• Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism

Applicants are encouraged to explore the Arms Control Association Web site to learn more about our work.

We will consider applicants with interests in the full range of our work. For the 2009-2010 program, ACA is especially seeking individuals with interest and skills related to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issues (in light of the 2010 NPT Review Conference) and threat assessment (to aid in the Realistic Threat Assessment and Responses Project led by Senior Fellow Greg Thielmann).

Specific work plans will be developed based on the selected fellow’s skills and interests, and will likely include research, writing, policymaker engagement, and other organizing that support the goals of the association.  

Selection Criteria

Fellows should have completed a graduate or undergraduate program in 2008 or 2009 and have demonstrated excellent academic accomplishments and a strong interest in the Arms Control Association’s issue areas. The Fellowship is limited to U.S. citizens or foreign citizens eligible to work in the United States.

Salary and Benefits

The Fellow receives an annual salary of $27,500 plus health benefits, including health insurance and disability coverage.

The Arms Control Association is an equal opportunity employer.  

Cheers!

Bruce






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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 45

Serial 45. 2009.08.13.

Tracking Events & Texts

2009.08.13.    Thursday

Group,

I’m experimenting with different ways of tracking events and texts. Two purposes: first, to be reminded of actions, statements, documents &c. germane to denuclearization and, second, to organize sources for easy discovery and access.

I’ve earlier introduced the GC.DD ChronFiles, reached via www.gcdd.net. Each page is a panel with three years’ of especially salient statements &c., organized by column (year) and month. Some entries quote at length; others are very brief.

The second vehicle is the Journal of Denuclearization Design. If you take a look via the index at

     
http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/INDEX.html

you’ll see articles but also appendices, one of which presents links to statements by government and organization officials. The aim is to collect especially statements on nuclear zero by governments of nuclear-weapon states.

But I’ve found that I come across less weighty citations, not worth revising and reposting a ChronFile, and certainly not worth revising and republishing the Journal. Nor would a list of raw citations work for me, since I really need just a sentence or two to explain why a citation is significant. This is the rationale for GC.DD Scribbles:

     http://www.gcdd.net/blog/gc.dd.blog.html

My aim is to make an entry a day, more or less. The criterion for inclusion is “am I likely to want to be reminded of this in the future?” By putting it into blog form I make it easily accessible to you. Using Blogger I cut the time needed to make and post an entry.  

Cheers!

Bruce






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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 46

Serial 46. 2009.09.12.

MORE RE Tracking Events & Texts

2009.09.12.    Saturday

Group,

To follow up CN45, it’s now a month since I initiated the blog
GC.DD SCRIBBLES. Enough entries have been posted for you to judge whether it’s a useful blog to bookmark. As of today it can also be reached from the right-hand column of the GC.DD home page: http://www.gcdd.net/

(Here CN46 repeats the text in CN45, immediately above.)  

Cheers!

Bruce


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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 47

Serial 47. 2009.09.18.

Australian Inquiry Report

2009.09.18.    Friday

Group,

I’ve blogged at
GC.DD SCRIBBLES issuance of the Australian Parliament’s Joint Select Committee on Treaties report: Report #106. Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

Inter alia it “recommends that the Australian Government allocate research and consultation resources to the development of a Nuclear Weapons Convention with a clear legal framework and enforceable verification.” (p. xxii) Full Report #106 is linked at http://gcdd.net/z8h5/

Other parts of the report deal with, for example, the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, a joint Australian and Japanese initiative. There are many extracts from submissions to the inquiry, and useful footnotes.

Cheers!

Bruce


Report #106. Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. Joint Select Committee on Treaties of the Australian Parliament. September 2009. (pdf)



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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 48

Serial 48. 2009.10.24.

JDD: ... The Timetable Problem

2009.10.24.    Saturday

Group,

I’ve posted to gcdd.net an article further developing thoughts on routes to ‘Nuclear Zero’: “Nuclear Zero: Agreement, Irreversibility, and the Timetable Problem.” You can reach it from the Journal of Denuclearization Design box on the right-hand side at
gcdd.net or by entering the full URL

     http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/J006=TX.064=2009.10.24.Timetable.pdf

We’ve designed the Journal to accommodate extensions and revisions of any single article. So if you have suggestions, or find something amiss, please let me know. Cheers!

Bruce




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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 49

Serial 49. 2009.11.18.

REVISED JDD: ... The Timetable Problem

2009.10.24.    Saturday

Group,

In October I told you that I had posted to gcdd.net an article developing thoughts on routes to ‘Nuclear Zero’: “Nuclear Zero: Agreement, Irreversibility, and the Timetable Problem.” I’ve now added six or seven pages, and made some other revisions. The current version is dated 2009.11.18. You can reach it from the Journal of Denuclearization Design box on the right-hand side at
gcdd.net or by entering the full URL

     http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/J006=TX.066=2009.11.18.Timetable.pdf

We’ve designed the Journal to accommodate extensions and revisions of any single article. Thanks to those who commented on the first draft. If you have suggestions, or find something amiss, please let me know.

Cheers!

Bruce




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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 50

Serial 50. 2010.01.10.

REVISED [MORE] JDD: ... The Timetable Problem

2010.01.10.    Sunday

Group,

In October and November I told you that I had posted to gcdd.net an article developing thoughts on routes to ‘Nuclear Zero’: “Nuclear Zero: Agreement, Irreversibility, and the Timetable Problem.” I’ve now added further discussion of the 15 December 2009 report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, and made some other revisions. The ICNND Report is the most ambitious effort to set a program of successive measures to be taken to achieve global zero.

The current version, incorporating comment on the Report, is dated 2010.01.03. You can reach it from the Journal of Denuclearization Design box on the right-hand side at
gcdd.net or by entering the full URL

     http://www.gcdd.net/JOURNAL/J006=TX.067=2010.01.03.Timetable.pdf

We’ve designed the Journal to accommodate extensions and revisions of any single article. Thanks to those who commented on the first draft. If you have suggestions, or find something amiss, please let me know.

Cheers!

Bruce




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COLLABORATIVE NOTES 51

Serial 51. 2010.02.16.

NEW MATERIALS AT gcdd.net

2010.02.16.    Tueseay

Group,

I’m delighted to tell you that I’ve posted four sets of vues that I have used to support presentations about denuclearization. They are Keynote (Apple) or PowerPoint (µsoft) screens. Our general ambivalence about using powerpoint is of course á propos, especially when the vues are just read out. But I’ve used them to emphasise main points and ensure that audience members unfamiliar with English were better able to follow.

So you can make believe you were at the talk, and make your own ad lib development of the points on the screen. You can browse the files online, or download either Keynote or PowerPoint versions as StuffIt or zip archives. Easy.

All of this is accessed through
http://www.gcdd.net/GC.DD=KEYNOTE.html.

But that’s not all! I’ve posted links to the several ‘Big Four’, or ‘Elders’, or ‘Four Wise Men’ variations on the theme that nuclear abolition should be put on the global agenda and some steps taken in the short-term and middle-term. The links are placed chronologically in the serial presentation of 2007-2010 statements on ZNW as Appendix B of the Journal of Denuclearization Design. You will find the links to Appendix B at the GC.DD website home page: http://www.gcdd.net/ (Impetus to give appropriate attention to these statements came from one of the European signers, who asked directly, in conversation, that the GC.DD site take note of his and others’s statements.)

I also should tell you that my description of ‘projects on denuclearization design’ at the ISODARCO winter course in January led two key faculty members at a US university to undertake to gather their colleagues sharing an interest in denuclearization and seek to identify a project suitable to their interests and knowledge. As far as I know, this is the first project directly tracable to Designing Denuclearization and talks promoting the action it proposes. Neat!

And finally: please if you have a moment take a look at the Keynote slides and let me know if you have any reaction or suggestions. These are easily improved, frames replaced, additional graphics added, &c. Please let me know.

Cheers!

Bruce




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